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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the pattern of recommendations on companies listed on the Korean Stock 
Exchange and the response of stock prices to the recommendations. There is evidence that 
brokerages affiliated with chaebols make overall less favorable recommendations than those 
unaffiliated with chaebols. But a chaebol brokerage tends to make more favorable 
recommendations to firms affiliated with its own chaebol. I find that stock prices respond more to 
recommendations made by chaebol brokerages. In particular, the stock price of a firm affiliated 
with a chaebol tends to respond more to recommendations issued by the brokerage affiliated with 
the same chaebol. Market responses also depend on whether the recommendations are anticipated. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
    This research examines the stock analysts‟ recommendations issued from brokerages owned by 
Korean Business Groups (hereafter called “Chaebols”). I mainly focus on two topics related to 
chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations. First, I examine whether recommendations from chaebol 
brokerages are systematically different from recommendations from non-chaebol brokerages. I 
also study market reactions to recommendations from chaebol brokerages which are faced with 
various incentives. Second, I examine market reactions to recommendations that agree with 
anticipations and those that do not agree with anticipations. To this end, I group recommendations 
into anticipated or unanticipated recommendations and examine price reactions to both groups. 
    I find empirical evidence that chaebol brokerages provide less favorable recommendations than 
non-chaebol brokerages. In general, market reactions to recommendations from chaebol 
brokerages are stronger than price reactions to recommendations from non-chaebol brokerages. I 
also find evidence that chaebol brokerage tend to make more favorable recommendations to firms 
affiliated with its own chaebol. Chaebol brokerages also issue less favorable recommendations 
for chaebol firms in the other chaebols. I find that the stock of a firm affiliated with a chaebol 
tends to respond more to recommendations issued by the brokerage affiliated with the same 
chaebol compared to stock price reactions to recommendations for chaebol firms from 
unaffiliated chaebol brokerages. 
    Market responses also depend on whether the recommendations are anticipated. I divide 
recommendation changes into two categories (anticipated or unanticipated) using either an 
ordered logit model or an ordered probit model. I find evidence that prices respond to
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unanticipated recommendations much stronger than they do to anticipated recommendations. In 
addition, stock prices rise more following unanticipated upgrade recommendations than they 
decline following unanticipated downgrade recommendations. 
The incentive of brokerages is related to that of investment banks. In general, the conflict of 
interest arises from the structure of investment banks which have two main divisions: the research 
division and the underwriting division. The research division provides recommendations to 
investors who want to obtain information about firms listed in the stock market in order to make 
investment decisions. The underwriting division provides underwriting service to firms that 
would like to issue and sell their stocks to the public. The conflicts of interest in the 
recommendations arise from the different incentives between the two divisions and influence the 
accuracy of information contained in their recommendation reports. 
    The underwriting division prefers more favorable recommendations for their clients (firms). 
The recommended firms might get advantages from favorable recommendations since firms with 
rosy recommendations or prospects are able to issue and sell their stocks easily and obtain more 
funds from the issuance of stock. Moreover, high stock prices might reduce the cost of capital of 
the recommended firm. In light of these advantages, investment banks have incentives to 
construct good relationships with covered firms by releasing favorable recommendations to 
participate in the process of an initial public offerings (hereafter called “IPOs”) or a seasoned 
equity offerings (hereafter called “SEOs”). They also have the incentive of fostering a good 
relationship with covered firms to obtain information from them. 
    On the other hand, the research division prefers accurate recommendations in which to guide 
their clients (investors) to appropriate investment decisions. The affiliated analysts who 
participate in the IPOs or SEOs are viewed as obtaining superior information for the affiliated 
firms. Investors might believe that affiliated analysts are able to provide more accurate 
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recommendations based on their superior information for affiliated firms. Moreover, an analyst 
has an incentive to provide accurate recommendations. Usually an analyst providing accurate 
recommendations is likely to build a good reputation that ultimately results in promotions within 
the brokerage firm. Hong and Kubik (2003) reported that analysts who provide accurate earnings 
forecasts are more likely to be better compensated by their resulting promotion within the 
brokerage firms.  
    The existence of chaebols is a distinguishing feature of the Korean economy. 
Recommendations from chaebol brokerages are influenced not only by incentives from the 
characteristics of investment banks but also special incentives from the special characteristics of 
chaebols. As reported in previous studies for chaebol firms
1
, chaebols have special characteristics. 
Chaebols consist of firms in different industries and chaebol firms are controlled by the owner or 
owner‟s family. A firm in the chaebol usually holds stocks of other firms in the same chaebol, 
which results in chaebol firms in the same chaebol that are closely connected with each other. 
Moreover, firms in the same chaebol assist and support each other in order to pursue the goals of 
their chaebol by sharing resources or via an intra-chaebol transaction. Actually, five of the ten 
largest chaebols, Samsung, LG, SK, Hyundai, and Hanhwa, have their own brokerages. These 
chaebol brokerages are also closely connected with firms in the same chaebol.  
    In previous studies about the conflict of interest in the stock analysts‟ recommendations in 
investment banks, I find two conflicting views about the accuracy of information from the 
affiliated analysts. The first view is that affiliated analysts issue more favorable recommendations 
following the incentives which their underwriting division pursued. Michaely and Womack 
(1999), Lin and McNichols (1998), Barber et al. (2007), Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), 
O‟Brien et al. (2005) supported the view of more favorable
                                                          
1
 See Bae, Cheon, and Kang (2008) and Chang and Hong (2000) 
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recommendations from affiliated analysts by their empirical results. The second view is that 
affiliated analysts provide more accurate information than unaffiliated analysts using superior 
information for affiliated firms. This view is based on the purpose of the research division in 
brokerage firms. Clarke et al. (2004), Jacob et al. (2008) presented that affiliated analysts‟ 
earnings forecasts are more accurate than unaffiliated analysts‟ earnings forecasts. Other previous 
studies examined different aspects of recommendations which influence the magnitude of stock 
price reactions: recommendations from different types of analysts
2
, large and small covered firms, 
and strength of recommendations
3
.  
    In addition to the above previous studies, chaebol brokerages have special incentives to follow 
the complex purpose of chaebols. In light of the relationships among firms and brokerages in the 
same chaebol, chaebol brokerages have incentives to release upward biased information for firms 
in the same chaebol. Like investment banks in the previous studies, chaebol brokerages might 
release upward biased information for other firms to participate in future IPOs or SEOs. Chaebol 
brokerages also might have the incentive of producing upward biased recommendations to have 
good relationships with covered firms for gathering better information of covered firms. Chaebol 
brokerages might issue a negatively biased recommendation for a firm in order to increase a 
firm‟s cost of capital if this firm is considered a competitor of their chaebol firm. In contrast, 
analysts employed by chaebol brokerages have incentives to provide accurate recommendations 
to obtain a good reputation, as accuracy of information tends to be rewarded by better salaries and 
higher status. Chaebol brokerages also have incentives to issue accurate recommendations in 
order to attract new clients. In addition, analysts in chaebol brokerages are likely to use superior
                                                          
2
 See Barber et al. (2007), Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006), Stickel (1995), Ryan and Taffler (2006), 
and Desai et al. (2000) 
3
 See Mikhail et al. (2007), Asquith et al. (2005), and Stickel (1995) 
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 information sources compared to data source of other non-chaebol brokerage, since chaebols 
collect and retain huge amount of data from various industries.  
    To test whether this conflict of interest exists, I look at two different definitions of “affiliated 
recommendation”. First, I use recommendations from chaebol brokerages as affiliated 
recommendations. This definition of affiliated recommendations is similar to that from Barber et 
al. (2007) which tested the potential conflict of interest in the investment banks compared to those 
in independent research firms. The second definition of affiliated recommendation is implied by 
various other researches, which define affiliated as recommendations for chaebol firms from 
affiliated chaebol brokerages. This idea is derived from papers on the conflict of interest in 
analysts hired by the underwriting investment banks. Previous papers assumed that the 
underwriting relationship between brokerages and covered firms represent this special connection. 
I assume that the relationship between firms and brokerages in the same chaebol is stronger than 
those from the underwriting process. Moreover, this relationship between firms and brokerage in 
the same chaebol is very clear to investors, although an affiliated underwriting relationship is not 
clear. Using these two ways to define an affiliation, I test whether chaebol analysts provide biased 
information and what influence the affiliated recommendations have on stock prices. 
    This research also examines the anticipation for recommendation changes. Most previous 
papers analyzed the market price reactions to recommendation changes. However, the market 
reactions to anticipated information releases or unanticipated information releases might be 
different. In general, we assume that the price reaction to unanticipated recommendation changes 
is stronger than those to anticipated recommendation changes
4
. This research will consider the
                                                          
4
 See Purda (2007). He examined the stock price reactions to predicted or unpredicted bond rating changes. 
But he did not find any empirical evidence that unpredicted bond rating changes generate stronger stock 
price reactions than predicted bond rating changes. 
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anticipations for recommendation changes by using probabilities of upgrade, downgrade, and 
reiteration in each recommendation.  
    Most previous papers reported abnormal returns or abnormal trading volumes due to changes 
in recommendations. These papers had implicitly assumed that stock market participants 
anticipated that the future recommendation might be the same as the previous recommendation, 
since they analyzed the abnormal returns from recommendation changes. As a result they 
regarded change in recommendation as new information. However, this assumption might be 
naïve and far from the actual anticipations of stock market participants. Although Purda (2007) 
reported there are no differences in stock price reactions from unpredicted and predicted bond 
rating changes, Balduzze et al. (2001) and Green (2004), Kuttner (2001) analyzed that 
unanticipated news or information in the financial market, such as the bond market or the interest 
market, have more influence on participants in these markets than does anticipated news or 
information. These results implied that market participants form their own anticipation about 
future economic status and prices. As a result, if they receive information or news which differ 
from their anticipation, they react strongly. For instance, the excess returns from upgrade 
recommendations which are anticipated reiteration or downgrade are greater than those of 
upgrade recommendations which were anticipated upgrade. It is often a difficult task to divide 
recommendations into unanticipated and anticipated recommendations. This research uses an 
ordered logit model (OLM) and an ordered probit model (OPM) to estimate the probabilities of 
recommendation changes, since I consider a recommendation change as a discrete and ordered 
dependent variable, such as upgrade, reiteration, and downgrade.  
    I find empirical evidence that chaebol brokerages issue less favorable recommendations than 
non-chaebol brokerages. The market reactions to the less favorable recommendations from 
chaebol brokerages cause stronger price reactions than more favorable recommendations from 
non-chaebol brokerages. As a consequence, the price reactions to chaebol brokerages‟ 
7 
 
recommendations are larger in magnitude than those to non-chaebol brokerages‟ 
recommendations. For the affiliation between brokerages and covered firms, I find evidence that 
is inconsistent with theory proposed by previous papers. In general, chaebol brokerages issue 
more favorable recommendations for firms affiliated with their own chaebol.  Chaebol brokerages 
also are reluctant to issue sell rating recommendations. However, the price reactions to more 
favorable recommendations from affiliated chaebol brokerages are more significant and stronger 
than less favorable recommendations from other unaffiliated brokerages. This evidence, that more 
favorable recommendations cause stronger price reactions, is inconsistent with result from most 
previous papers, except Clarke et al. (2004)
5
. I also find that the price reactions to unanticipated 
recommendation changes are much stronger than those to anticipated recommendation changes. 
However, the magnitude of price reactions between upgrade and downgrade are asymmetric. The 
price reactions from unanticipated upgrades is greater than those from unanticipated downgrades. 
    In section 2 I summarize previous papers and present hypothesis of this research. In section 3 I 
summarize and explain my data, where I present the summary of recommendations and 
brokerages in the sample. I also report the distributions of recommendations from chaebol or non-
chaebol brokerages and indicate whether recommendations are biased or not. Section 4, 5 and 6 
are used to discuss the empirical results. Using the event-time analysis (CARs) and the calendar-
time analysis (portfolio returns), I report the stock price reactions to recommendations from 
chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages in section 4. Section 5 is used to examine the differences 
between affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations and to report the stock price reactions to 
recommendations covering chaebol firms from self-brokerages (affiliated brokerages) or 
unaffiliated brokerages. Section 6 presents methods to measure anticipation for recommendations 
                                                          
5
 They reported that investment bank analysts‟ recommendations have stronger price reactions, whereas 
investment banks issue more favorable recommendations on average.  
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and examines the differences between anticipated and unanticipated recommendations. Finally, 
Section 7 is the summary and conclusions. 
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Chapter II 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
1. Literature Review 
    For several decades, many researchers have been interested in stock analysts‟ 
recommendations and whether stock analysts‟ recommendations are valuable or not to investors. 
A few earlier papers by Cowles (1933), Longue and Tuttle (1973), and Bidwell (1977) reported 
that investment strategies that follow stock analysts‟ recommendations do not produce any excess 
returns and therefore recommendations are not valuable to investors.  
    In contrast to earlier papers, most recent papers (Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2001, 2007), 
Stickel (1995), Asquith et al. (2005), and Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) etc.) reported that stock 
analysts‟ recommendations are valuable information sources for investors. These researches 
reported that stock analysts‟ recommendations provide valuable information and showed that 
stock analysts‟ recommendations produce significant excess returns. Secondly, researchers have 
been interested in the specific characteristics or information content in the recommendations. 
They examined that recommendations which include specific characteristics or information 
provide more profitable information to investors of the stock market. As a consequence, many 
subsequent papers tested price reactions due to characteristics of information contained in stock 
analysts‟ recommendation reports.  
    The main topics of this research are twofold. The first is the incentives of chaebol brokerages, 
information contained in their recommendations, and the market response to their 
recommendations. The second is the market response to unanticipated or anticipated 
recommendations. To this end, I review papers that examined the characteristics of
10 
 
recommendations related to the relationship between brokerage and covered firm (affiliated or 
unaffiliated analysts), types of brokerages (reputation of analysts, size of brokerages, and the 
location of brokerages), types of covered firms (the size of the covered firm), and the strength of 
information in the recommendations. I also review previous papers which studied chaebol 
brokerages.  
1.1. Information from affiliated or unaffiliated analysts 
    Michaely and Womack (1999), and Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), Lin and McNichols 
(1998), O‟Brien et al. (2005), Clarke et al. (2004), Jacob et al. (2008) investigated the differences 
in stock price reactions to information provided by affiliated analysts and unaffiliated analysts. I 
found there are two different points of view to the recommendations issued by affiliated analysts. 
The first view is that affiliated recommendations are usually upward biased. Affiliated analysts 
have incentives to issue more favorable recommendations for firms which are related in their 
previous underwriting processes. Usually, underwriters would like to make their underwriting 
firms more successful by higher stock prices after the IPO or SEO. They also want to maintain 
good relationships with these firms in order to be selected as the underwriters in future IPOs or 
SEOs. Consequently, they are likely to release more positive recommendations than other 
brokerages‟ recommendations. The second view is that the affiliated analysts provide accurate 
recommendations to the public. Since the underwriting analysts might have an advantage in 
gaining superior information for the IPO or SEO firms, affiliated analysts have superior skills to 
gain and interpret information for making accurate recommendations. 
    Michaely and Womack (1999), and Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), Lin and McNichols 
(1998), O‟Brien et al. (2005) reported that affiliated analysts tend to release upward biased 
information and that abnormal returns from affiliated analysts‟ recommendations underperformed.
11 
 
These papers indicated that the conflict of interest by affiliated analysts make affiliated analysts‟ 
recommendations biased.  
    Michaely and Womack (1999) studied the credibility of recommendations which were issued 
from the underwriting analysts. They examined the difference in excess returns between 
recommendations from affiliated brokerages and those from unaffiliated brokerages by using IPO 
firm data from 1990 to 1991 in the US stock market. They defined any brokerages participating in 
the underwriting process as the affiliated brokerages. They reported that the size-adjusted excess 
returns of buy recommendations from unaffiliated brokerages were greater than those from 
affiliated brokerages for a three-day window around the recommendation date. The excess returns 
from the unaffiliated or affiliated analysts were 4.4% and 2.7% respectively. This paper indicated 
that their results might be evidence of a conflict of interests for affiliated analysts. Furthermore, 
their results showed that investors take the relationship between brokerages and covered firms 
into consideration in evaluating analysts‟ recommendations. Their conclusion was that the 
credibility of recommendations by affiliated analysts was lower than those by unaffiliated 
analysts.  
    Lin and McNichols (1998) studied the announcement effects associated with recommendations 
from the underwriting analysts‟ prospects, such as earnings forecast and recommendations. Their 
study used SEO firm data from 1989 to 1994 in the US stock market. They reported that the 
affiliated analysts provide more positive earnings forecast and recommendations than unaffiliated 
analysts. This result indicated that the affiliated analysts are influenced by the underwriting 
relationships with covered firms when analysts issue recommendations. They also reported the 
different stock price reactions between the affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations. They 
found that investors discount the affiliated hold-level recommendation and react to these 
recommendations just as they would to the unaffiliated sell-level recommendations. Also, the 
price reactions associated with the strong buy-level or buy-level recommendations are similar 
12 
 
between the affiliated and the unaffiliated recommendations. This result indicated that investors 
take the underwriting relationship between brokerages and covered firms into consideration in 
evaluating analysts‟ recommendations. Overall, results from this study supported the finding that 
the affiliated analysts provide upward biased recommendations rather than superior information 
and that investors recognize the conflict of interest in affiliated analysts. 
    Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) reported the upward bias recommendations from 
affiliated analysts by using data in the US stock market from October, 1993 to December, 2002. 
They divided the entire sample into two parts: affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations by the 
participation in underwriting. Although their main concern is the differences in the trade reaction 
between large traders and small traders, they also reported that all analysts‟ recommendations had 
upward bias. Moreover, the upward bias of the affiliated analysts‟ recommendation was greater 
than those of the unaffiliated analysts‟ recommendation. This difference between affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts indicated the existence of the conflict of interest in affiliated analysts. 
Consequently, investors have incentives to distinguish between recommendations from affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts to evaluate the value of stock analysts‟ recommendations. 
    O‟Brien et al. (2005) studied the timing of the recommendation issues from affiliated analysts. 
They reported that the affiliated analysts upgraded recommendations faster than the unaffiliated 
analysts did and the affiliated analysts downgraded recommendations slower than the unaffiliated 
analysts did. These results indicated that affiliated analysts provide biased recommendations 
because they are prone to defer announcements of bad information for affiliated covered firms, 
although affiliated analysts are likely to announce good information for affiliated covered firms 
as quickly as possible. 
    Jacob et al. (2008) examined the forecast accuracy and the optimism of the prospects provided 
by analysts in investment banks or in affiliated investment banks. They used the analyst forecasts 
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from 1995 to 2003. First, they compared the accuracy of forecasts from analysts employed by any 
investment banks with those from analysts employed by brokerages which never engaged in any 
underwriting processes. They also compared the accuracy of forecasts from analysts employed by 
affiliated investment banks with those from analysts employed by unaffiliated investment banks. 
They reported that investment bank analysts or affiliated investment bank analysts provide more 
accurate and less optimistic forecasts than non-investment banks analysts or unaffiliated 
investment bank analysts do. The result from this research might indicate that investment banks 
(affiliated investment banks) have superior information sources and/or hire higher quality 
analysts compared to non-investment banks (unaffiliated investment banks). The conclusion of 
this research is that the conflict of interest in the affiliated analysts or the investment banks is a 
less serious problem than we expected, and it might not be an important factor that analysts 
consider when issuing forecasts. As a consequence, this paper provided evidence of the 
hypothesis that affiliated analysts provide superior information to investors. 
    Clarke et al. (2004) examined whether analysts hired by investment banks provide biased 
information due to conflicts of interest, or whether they provide more accurate information due to 
better information sources. They used the earnings forecast and stock recommendations from 
1993 to 2002 to test their hypotheses. They reported that earnings forecast provided by 
investment bank analysts are less optimistic and more accurate than those by analysts hired by 
independent research firms. They also reported that price reactions due to recommendation 
changes by analysts hired by investment banks are significantly greater than those by analysts 
hired by independent research firms, whereas analysts hired by investment banks tend to issue 
more favorable recommendations (strong buy or buy) than analysts at independent research firms. 
Although investment bank analysts‟ recommendations are looked upon as they are upward biased, 
information from investment bank analysts is generally more informative. As a result, price 
reactions due to information from investment bank analysts are greater than those from other
14 
 
 independent brokerage analysts. This paper indicated investment bank analysts are influenced by 
incentives to issue upward biased recommendations. However, investment bank analysts‟ 
recommendations have greater effects on stock prices. This strange phenomenon might be 
explained if investment bank analysts access better information sources or if investment banks 
hire analysts who have superior skills at choosing undervalued stocks.    
1.2. Information from different types of analysts 
    Barber et al. (2007), Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006), Stickel (1995), Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2006), Ryan and Taffler (2006) , and Desai et al. (2000) examined different aspect of analysts or 
brokerages. These papers studied the performances of stock recommendations issued by analysts 
or brokerages which they categorized by the reputation, the size of brokerages, and the location. 
    Barber et al. (2007) examined the performance of recommendations from large investment 
banks and independent brokerages. They used recommendations in the US stock market from 
1996 to 2003. This research investigated implicit affiliated relationships between investment 
banks and covered firms. This paper implicitly assumed that investment banks tend to make 
upward biased recommendations based on the conflict of interest in investment banks. They 
formed buy-and-hold portfolios for two recommendation groups: the strong buy/buy and the 
hold/sell. They found that the abnormal returns from the buy portfolio associated with the 
recommendations from independent brokerages outperform those associated with the investment 
banks. Moreover, they reported that all types of investment banks‟ buy recommendations 
generated lower abnormal returns than the independent brokerage. These results indicated that 
investment bank analysts do not provide better information for the covered firm than independent 
analysts. Investors also recognize that investment bank analysts are faced with conflicts of 
interest and they tend to release biased information. As a result, they looked likely to discount 
investment bank analysts‟ recommendations when they evaluated these recommendations. 
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    Stickel (1995) studied the effects from recommendation changes issued by different types of 
analysts and different types of brokerage firms. He reported that recommendation changes by 
highly reputed analysts had more influence on stock prices than those made by less reputed 
analysts using an eleven-day window. He also found that recommendation changes by large 
brokerage firms had more impact on stock prices than those made by small brokerage firms for an 
eleven-day window. These larger price reactions to recommendation changes from reputed 
analysts or large brokerage firms implied that market participants take the type of analyst and the 
size of brokerage firm into consideration in evaluating the quality of information in 
recommendations. Usually, investors are prone to follow recommendations from highly reputed 
analysts or large brokerages compared to recommendations from less reputed analysts or small 
brokerages. This result indicates that analysts‟ types or brokerage size are characteristics that 
influence the magnitude of stock price reactions.  
    Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006) examined the difference in stock price reactions to 
recommendation changes between experienced analysts and less experienced analysts. They used 
the years of working experience as a stock analyst to measure a stock analyst‟s ability. They also 
used the reputation of brokerage firms as a proxy of a stock analyst‟s ability, since reputed 
brokerage firms tend to hire analysts who have superior skill to recommend good prospective 
stocks. They showed that stock prices are more responsive to the recommendations issued by 
analysts who were either highly experienced or who were hired by reputable brokerage firms. The 
result of this research indicated that stock analysts who had more experiences or were hired by 
highly reputed brokerage houses were able to provide better predictions for stock prices. This 
result also showed that stock market participants consider the type of analyst when they evaluate 
stock analysts‟ recommendations.  
    Desai et al. (2000) studied whether highly reputed analysts have superior skills to choose 
under-valued stocks. They used recommendations provided by Wall Street Journal all-star
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analysts as recommendations from highly reputed analysts. They reported that recommendations 
from reputed analysts outperform and that the outperformance of reputed stock analysts indicates 
their superior skills to picking stocks.  
    Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) examined the stock price reaction to recommendation changes by 
analysts who are located in different countries. They studied the differences in excess returns 
between US stock analysts and foreign analysts using American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). 
They reported that the excess returns from recommendation changes by US analysts were higher 
than those from recommendation changes by foreign analysts. They concluded that US analysts 
have more skill in identifying mispriced stocks and predicting stock prices in contrast to previous 
research where reputation of analysts was not found to be a significant factor of the determinant 
of excess returns.  
    Ryan and Taffler (2006) reported that analyst reputation is not a factor which determines the 
size of stock price reaction to recommendations using the UK stock market data. Actually, since 
they found that the accuracy of recommendation is not the dominant factor to determine analyst 
reputation in the UK stock market, highly reputed analysts‟ recommendations have not had 
significant effects on stock prices. They also insisted that this result might be an evidence of less 
conflict of interest in the UK market.  
    Desai and Jain (1995) studied the performance of recommendations by highly reputed analysts 
using data from 1968 to 1991. They also reported that the abnormal returns from buy 
recommendations were not significantly different from zero in the short-term (25-day window) 
and long-term (250-day window). They concluded that highly reputed stock analysts do not 
possess better abilities to predict stock prices or to find under-priced stocks. 
1.3. Information for large or small covered firms
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    Previous papers examined whether the characteristics of covered firms affect the performance 
of analysts‟ recommendations. Stickel (1995), Barber et al. (2007) and Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) 
reported that the size of covered firms is one of the factors that have an effect on the magnitude of 
stock price reactions to analysts‟ recommendations. According to the marginal information effect 
of a new recommendation, in general, price reactions from new recommendations for large firms 
are smaller than price reactions from recommendations for small firms. This is due to the fact that 
investors have a relative abundance of information about large firms and not enough information 
about small firms.  
    Stickel (1995) reported that recommendation changes for small firms have greater price 
reactions than recommendation changes for large firms for both upgrades and downgrades for an 
eleven-day window. Furthermore, these firm-size effects continue for longer windows. He 
reported that these results are consistent with the marginal information effects of small firms and 
are greater than those of large firms. Barber et al. (2007) also reported that portfolio returns for 
small stocks are larger than those for large or medium stocks. This result supports the hypothesis 
that marginal information effects of recommendations for small stocks is larger than those for 
large stocks, since additional information for small stocks were provided by analysts.  
    Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) compared the excess returns from recommendation changes 
between two groups, large firms and small firms. They used excess returns of portfolios 
constructed by buying all upgrades and selling all downgrades for large and small firms. They 
reported that excess returns from small firm portfolios are generally greater than those from large 
firm portfolios in most G7 countries. For instance, the difference in excess returns between large 
and small stock portfolios in the U.S was 5.26% for a month and in Japan was 3.58% for a month. 
These papers presented that recommendations covering small firms have greater impacts on stock 
prices than recommendations covering large firms. These results indicated the “small firm effect,” 
that the marginal effect of information for small firms is greater than those for large firms, since
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less information is typically available about small firms than large firms. In general, large firms 
frequently release information for themselves. Moreover, large firms are followed by a lot of 
analysts. Therefore, investors already have a lot of information for large firms. On the other hand, 
because of the small number of following analysts and less frequently provided information by 
small firms, investors are not able to easily obtain information for small firms.  
    As a result, the marginal effects on stock prices from additional recommendations for large 
firms may be relatively small, when investors already have enough information to make 
investment decisions. However, the marginal effects on stock prices from recommendations for 
small firms may be relatively large, because investors generally do not have enough information 
in advance.  
1.4. The strength of information in recommendations  
    The strength of recommendation may be a factor which influences the stock price reaction. In 
general, investors think that two or more grades changes of recommendation have greater 
influences on stock prices than only one grade change of recommendation. Mikhail et al. (2007) 
and Stickel (1995) studied the strength of recommendation changes. They tested recommendation 
changes that skip a rank and concluded that these yield greater price reactions than 
recommendation changes that do not skip a rank. In general, recommendation changes that skip a 
rank are considered to generate greater price reactions than recommendation changes that do not 
skip a rank, since large changes in recommendation levels mean large changes of analysts‟ 
predictions for stock prices.  
    Stickel (1995) investigated the relationship between the magnitude of recommendation changes 
and the cumulative excess return due to recommendation changes. He used a cross-sectional 
analysis which used a cumulative abnormal return for an eleven-day window around the event
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date as a dependent variable. For upgrades, recommendations which were changed two levels or 
more had a coefficient of + 0.32. For downgrades, coefficient on recommendations which were 
changed two or more levels had -0.45. These coefficients were statistically significant at the 0.10 
and 0.05 levels, respectively. He concluded that these results were evidence of the greater 
influence from recommendation changes of two or more levels. The results indicate that investors 
consider the large changes of recommendation level as more informative and that investors tend 
to follow recommendations with large level changes.  
    Mikhail et al (2007) also examined the investors‟ responses to strength of analysts‟ 
recommendation changes. They measured the investors‟ responses using abnormal trading 
volumes. They reported that investors increased their trading volume as the size of the change of 
the recommendation levels increased. Furthermore, they showed that large investors reacted more 
to recommendation changes than small investors. These results indicate that the magnitude of 
recommendation change is able to impact the behavior of investors. As a result, stock prices may 
be influenced by the magnitude of recommendation changes following the change of investors‟ 
behaviors. 
    In addition, investors take strength of arguments into consideration in making decisions. 
Asquith et al. (2005) and Stickel (1995) examined the performances of recommendation changes 
supported by additional information such as earnings forecast or target price changes. The quality 
of information contained in recommendation changes may affect the size of stock price reactions. 
If recommendation changes have perceived higher quality of information, then these 
recommendation changes lead to larger reactions in stock prices 
    Stickel (1995) studied the relationship between recommendation changes accompanied by 
additional information and the cumulative abnormal returns for an eleven-day window. He used 
earnings forecast revisions and earnings announcements as additional information. He reported
20 
 
that recommendation changes supported by changes of earnings forecasts had stronger price 
reactions than recommendation changes without additional information. Furthermore, the excess 
returns from recommendation changes that conflict with earnings forecast revisions had smaller 
price reactions than those without earnings forecast changes. He concluded that additional 
information which confirmed recommendation changes may affect the size of stock price 
reactions.  
    Asquith et al. (2005) studied the information contents of stock analyst‟ reports; they used price 
targets, earning forecasts, and analysts‟ justifications to examine the effects of the contents in the 
recommendation reports. They reported asymmetric price reactions to the information contents 
between upgrade and downgrade recommendations. For down-grade recommendations, most 
information in the analysts‟ recommendation reports was significant to investors. For reiterate 
recommendations, target prices and the analysts‟ justifications are significant factors. For up-
grade recommendations, however, no information in the analysts‟ reports had significant price 
reactions. They concluded that investors evaluate the contents of recommendation changes using 
different standards for upgrades, reiterations, and downgrades. 
1.5. Studies for chaebols 
    In this study, I used stock analysts‟ recommendations for companies on the Korean Stock 
Market, since I would like to study incentives of chaebol brokerages, characteristics of their 
recommendations, and stock market reactions for chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations. 
Chaebols are a unique feature of the Korean industry. Chaebol firms have different characteristics 
from non-chaebol firms. A chaebol is controlled by the owner or owner‟s family and consists of 
various types of firms. The firms included in chaebols usually hold stocks of other firms in the 
same chaebol. This cross-shareholding means that firms in the same chaebol are closely affiliated. 
Moreover, firms in the same chaebol assist and support each other to pursue the goal of their
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chaebol by sharing their resources or intra-group transactions. Because some chaebols possess 
their own securities company (brokerage), I am able to divide the recommendations in to two 
groups; recommendations from chaebol brokerages and recommendations from non-chaebol 
brokerages. I also divide recommendations which cover chaebol firms into three categories. The 
first is a self-recommendation which is issued from the brokerage in the same chaebol. I examine 
the special features from these chaebol affiliated recommendations. The second is other chaebol 
brokerages‟ recommendations which are issued from the other chaebol brokerages. The last 
category is non-chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations issued by non-chaebol brokerages. 
    To understand characteristics of chaebol, I present some previous papers which examined 
characteristics of chaebols. Bae, Cheon, and Kang (2008) studied the announcement effects due 
to an increase of earnings from a chaebol firm. They used 694 earnings announcements from 
1993 to 2001 as events. They reported that the announcement of earnings increases have positive 
influences on not only stock price of the firm which announced earnings increases, but also stock 
prices of other firms in the same chaebol. If firms in the same chaebol share their resources, then 
an earnings increase of one chaebol firm is considered as good news for other firms in the same 
chaebol. This result, where stock prices of firms in the same chaebol move together due to 
earnings increases, also supports the strong connection among firms in the same chaebol. In light 
of the connection among firms in the same chaebol, we also assume that chaebol firms are 
affected by any recommendation for firms in the same chaebol. As a consequence, analysts in the 
chaebol brokerages might be reluctant to issue unfavorable recommendations for firms in the 
same chaebol, since this unfavorable information for the same chaebol firm might impact 
negatively on the market valuation of the brokerage.  
    This paper implicitly indicates that analysts in chaebol brokerages have an incentive to provide 
upward biased recommendations to firms in the same chaebol. 
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    Chang and Hong (2000) investigated the profits of chaebol firms on the resource sharing 
among chaebol firms or intra-chaebol transactions. They reported that chaebol firms broadly 
share resources especially for intangible and financial resources. They also indicate that chaebol 
firms are engaged in intra-chaebol transactions to transfer resources among firms. This paper 
indicates that chaebol firms are likely to be considered a part of the chaebol and that they run 
their business not only for their own profitability, but for the purpose of the whole chaebol. If 
chaebol brokerages share information with other firms in the same chaebol, then chaebol analysts 
could access inside information about chaebol firms and could use information that analysts in the 
same chaebol brokerage already gathered. In contrast, the intra-chaebol transactions support the 
hypothesis that chaebol analysts have an incentive to issue upward biased recommendations for 
the same chaebol firms. Under such circumstances, chaebol brokerages are prone to provide 
upward biased recommendations for increasing stock prices of the same chaebol firms. 
1.6. Studies for effects of anticipation in financial markets 
    The market reactions to expected information releases and unexpected information releases 
might be different. I hypothesize that a reaction to unexpected information is larger than a 
reaction to expected information.  
    Purda (2007) examined the stock price reactions between predicted and unpredicted bond 
rating changes. He used average cumulative abnormal returns and bond rating changes by 
Moody‟s and S&P. He predicted a bond rating change using an ordered probit model and reported 
there was no evidence that the average cumulative abnormal returns of unpredicted bond rating 
changes were larger than those of predicted bond rating changes. Kuttner (2001) investigated the 
relationship between market interest rates and target federal funds rates. He used the federal funds 
rate data from the futures market to separate the expected and unexpected components of each 
target federal funds rates‟ change. He found that market interest rates reaction were highly 
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significant and large when due to unexpected target rates changes, while the movements in 
market interest rates were small when caused by expected changes. These results indicate that 
market participants compare their expectations to target rates and actual target rate changes and 
that they act based on this comparison. Balduzze et al. (2001) studied the Treasury securities‟ 
price reactions to economic announcements. They used forecasts‟ survey data to identify the 
unexpected component of economic announcements. They reported that unexpected components 
lead to price volatility. This implies that bond market participants also react differently to surprise 
information and they adjust their actions to surprising information. Green (2004) examined the 
impact of macroeconomic news on the bond market. He reported that bond market reactions to 
macroeconomic news were related to the surprise component of news. Even though he did not 
distinguish unexpected news from expected news, he showed that the bond market investors were 
able to identify unexpected news and that they reacted to unexpected news.  
 
2. Hypotheses 
    Overall, the excess returns from recommendations are influenced by the characteristics of 
brokerages, covered firms, and the relationship between brokerages and covered firms. Moreover, 
presented in Barber et al. (2007), implicit conflicts of interest have to be considered when 
investors evaluate the recommendations. Based on the previous research, I explore explicit 
research questions of how recommendations relate to affiliation of brokerages and how the 
market responds to recommendations with different brokerage affiliations. I present two 
alternative hypotheses for chaebol brokerages. The first hypothesis is “incentive” hypothesis that 
chaebol brokerages tend to issue biased recommendations since they follow the incentives of the 
underwriting division. The second hypothesis is “information” hypothesis that chaebol 
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brokerages are likely to issue correct recommendations to obtain a higher reputation or to attract 
more clients in the market. 
H1: Chaebol brokerages make systematically different recommendations from non-chaebol 
brokerages and recommendations from chaebol brokerages lead to different price reactions than 
recommendations from non-chaebol brokerages. 
    Brokerages are generally classified as either issuing more or less favorable recommendations. 
Brokerages may issue more favorable recommendations if they are compelled by “incentive” 
hypothesis to maximize revenue from the underwriting division, to keep good relationship with 
the covered firm, or to stimulate the volume of stock trading. Alternatively, they also may issue 
less favorable recommendations if they are forced by incentive to increase the cost of capital for 
firms which compete with firms in the recommending brokerage‟s chaebol. As reported in prior 
research
6
, in general, recommendations issued by analysts who issue more favorable 
recommendations on average generate smaller magnitude of price reactions than those by analysts 
who issue less favorable recommendations on average.  
H1-1: If chaebol brokerages provide more favorable recommendations following “incentive” 
hypothesis, then price reactions to chaebol brokerages’ recommendations are weaker than those 
to non-chaebol brokerages’ recommendations.  
H1-2: If chaebol brokerages provide less favorable recommendations following “information” 
hypothesis, then price reactions to chaebol brokerages’ recommendations are stronger than those 
to non-chaebol brokerages’ recommendations. 
    Another research question is related to the affiliation between chaebol brokerage and chaebol 
covered firm. 
                                                          
6
 See Barber et al. (2007). They reported that investment banks issue overall more favorable 
recommendations and the price reactions to these recommendations are smaller.  
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H2: Chaebol brokerage issues different recommendations to firms affiliated with its own chaebol 
and the price reactions to these affiliated recommendations are different in magnitude to 
reactions to recommendations from unaffiliated chaebol brokerages or non-chaebol brokerages. 
    There are two contradictory views to the conflict of interest in the stock analysts‟ 
recommendations. The first view is that affiliated analysts issue more favorable recommendations 
and that these recommendations underperformed
7 . This view is consistent with “incentive” 
hypothesis. The other view is that affiliated analysts provide more accurate information and this 
information has greater impacts on the stock prices
8. This view is consistent with “information” 
hypothesis. Most previous papers showed that affiliated brokerages are prone to issue more 
favorable recommendations to firms affiliated in the relationship of underwriting. These 
recommendations from affiliated brokerages tend to be discounted by investors. Hence the price 
reactions to affiliated recommendations are smaller than the price reactions to recommendations 
from unaffiliated or independent brokerages. So, I present two alternative hypotheses about 
recommendations from affiliated chaebol brokerages. 
In light of the first view,  
H2-1: If a chaebol brokerage is dependent to its own chaebol, affiliated chaebol brokerages make 
more favorable recommendations to affiliated chaebol firms to increase the market value of these 
firms. Price reactions to these recommendations might be weaker than recommendations from 
other unaffiliated brokerages.  
According to the second view,
                                                          
7
 See Michaely and Womack (1999), Lin and McNichols (1998), Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), 
and O‟Brien et al. (2005).  
8
 See Jacob et al. (2008), and Clarke et al. (2004) 
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H2-2: Affiliated chaebol brokerages issue more accurate recommendations using superior 
information and these recommendations cause stronger price reactions than recommendations 
from other unaffiliated brokerages. 
    The third research question is related to the anticipations of recommendations. 
H3: Stock price reactions to unanticipated or anticipated recommendation changes are different.  
    I consider two alternative results for the anticipations of recommendations. First, investors 
form their own anticipations for stock prices in general. If they receive recommendations which 
differ from their own anticipation, then investors might react strongly, especially if the 
unanticipated recommendation contains significantly new information. On the other hand, if 
investors consider that anticipations for recommendation changes are not important to making 
their decisions, then information contained in anticipated or unanticipated recommendation 
changes is identical to investors. Therefore, price reactions to anticipated or unanticipated 
recommendation changes are identical.  
H3-1: Price reactions to unanticipated recommendation changes are stronger than those to 
anticipated recommendation changes. 
H3-2: Price reactions to anticipated or unanticipated recommendation changes are not different. 
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Chapter III 
Data Description 
 
1. Summary of data 
    This research uses stock analysts‟ recommendations for firms listed on the Korean Stock 
Exchanges (hereafter called “KSE”) from the Fn-Guide which is one of the most popular 
investment guides in Korea. It is provided by the Samsung Securities Company. The Fn-Guide 
provides an entire set of recommendations issued by all brokerage companies. However, it only 
provides recommendations about firms listed on the KSE. The original data set which I obtain 
includes 83,612 stock analysts‟ recommendations issued from January 2000 to October 2004. I 
delete recommendations that I am not able to use due to the unavailability of their daily stock 
prices or their daily market capital for the whole sample period. In addition, I also delete 
recommendations for which I am not able to find previous recommendations for the same covered 
firm by the same brokerage company. After deleting these recommendations from the data set, 
71,272 recommendations remain. I obtain the daily stock prices and the market index from the 
KISFAS provided by the Korea Information Service.
9
 This database provides various financial 
information about Korean firms and the Korean stock market such as stock prices, a market index, 
financial ratios, accounting data, and general information about individual firms. I collect the data 
about the chaebols and the chaebol brokerages from the Korea Fair Trade Commission 
database.
10
 The Korea Fair Trade Commission is a government organization which formulates 
and administers competition policies, and deliberates, decides, and handles 
                                                          
9
 http://www.kisvalue.com 
10
 http://www.ftc.go.kr 
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antitrust cases. It announces the ranking of chaebols and also announces the list of firms which 
are included in each chaebol.  
    In this research, I categorize recommendations into four levels, although the Fn-Guide database 
provides five levels of recommendations. In Fn-Guide database, level 1 is a “Strong Buy” 
recommendation, which is the most favorable recommendation level. Level 2 is a “Buy”, level 3 
is a “Hold”, level 4 is a “Sell”, and level 5 is a “Strong Sell” recommendation. However, this 
study uses: “Strong Buy”, “Buy”, “Hold”, and “Sell” recommendation levels; The 
recommendation levels are the same as those provided by the Fn-guide database except “Sell” 
recommendations. In this study, the “Sell” recommendation included “Sell” and “Strong Sell” 
recommendations from the Fn-Guide database. There are two reasons why I put “Sell” and 
“Strong Sell” together in one level. First, the number of “Strong Sell” recommendations are 
relatively small (173 recommendations and 0.3% of total observation) and results from “Strong 
Sell” and “Sell” categories are very similar. Second, I form two portfolios which are the strong 
buy/buy portfolio and the hold/sell portfolio to calculate portfolio returns. Therefore, I do not 
need to distinguish the “Strong Sell” recommendations from the “Sell” recommendations for the 
analysis of portfolio returns.  Moreover, stock market participants recognize that both “Strong 
Sell” and “Sell” recommendations are bad news for covered firms and may think that “Sell” and 
“Strong Sell” recommendations are not appreciably different, since these two kind 
recommendations are issued very rarely. As a consequence, there is no need to distinguish 
“Strong Sell” from “Sell” recommendations.  
    <Table3-1> shows the levels of total recommendations used in this paper. It indicates that there 
were 43,795 buy-rating recommendations (Level 1 and Level 2), which is 61.4% of the total 
recommendations. The number of buy-rating recommendations is far greater than those of sell-
rating recommendations (Level 4, Sell and Strong Sell) as there are only 1,376 (2.0%) in this 
category. Most recommendations are buy-rating (60.5%) and hold-rating (36.6%). 
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<Table3-1> Levels of recommendations 
Recommendation Level 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004   00-04 
 
N N N N N 
 
N(%) 
1(Strong Buy) 35 71 286 192 88 
 
672(0.9%) 
2(Buy) 1012 8382 10696 12967 10066 
 
43123(60.5%) 
3(Hold) 527 6950 5683 7773 5168 
 
26101(36.6%) 
4(Sell, Strong Sell) 109 754 297 128 88 
 
1376(2.0%) 
        Total 1683 16157 16962 21060 15410 
 
71272 
        
Average of recommendation levels 2.42 2.52 2.35 2.37 2.34   2.40 
 
    The distribution of recommendations represents that stock analysts frequently issue buy-rating 
recommendations and rarely issue sell-rating recommendations. This distribution is consistent 
with the results from previous papers (Cliff (2006), Barber et al. (2001), Stickel (1995), Asquith 
et al. (2005), and Ryan and Taffler (2006) etc.). These papers also reported that stock analysts 
provide more buy-rating recommendations than sell-rating recommendations. The last row of the 
table presents the average level of recommendations. The average level of all recommendations in 
the sample is 2.40 which is closer to buy than hold. This table also indicates that the averages of 
recommendation levels in 2000 and 2001 are higher than 2002, 2003, and 2004, meaning analysts 
issued more favorable recommendations in 2002 -2004 compared to 2000-2001.  
    <Table3-2> shows the transition matrix of recommendations which presents recommendation 
changes and reiterations. The bold numbers in the diagonal of the table show the number of 
reiterate recommendations at each previous level. For instance, the first row shows there are 726 
previous “Strong Buy” recommendations. Of these, 507 “Strong Buy” recommendations are 
reiterated, 193 are downgraded to “Buy”, 25 are downgraded to “Hold”, and 1 recommendation is 
downgraded to “Sell”. A number in parentheses shows the percentage of current 
recommendations‟ level given the previous recommendations‟ level. For instance, the 69.8% 
which is shown below 507 (in the first row and the first column) means that the percentage of 
“Strong Buy” reiterations is 69.8% when previous recommendations are “Strong Buy.”
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<Table3-2> Transition matrix of recommendations  
Previous     Current Recommendation 
Recommendation   1 2 3 4   total 
1  
507 193 25 1 
 
726 
 
(69.8%) (26.6%) (3.4%) (0.2%) 
  
2  
146 40403 2986 42 
 
43577 
 
(0.3%) (92.7%) (6.9%) (0.1%) 
  
3  
16 2486 22878 203 
 
25583 
 
(0.1%) (9.7%) (89.4%) (0.8%) 
  
4  
3 41 212 1130 
 
1386 
 
(0.2%) (3.0%) (15.3%) (81.5%) 
  
  
       
total   672 43123 26101 1376   71272 
a. The numbers represent the number of recommendations in each category. 
b. A number in parentheses represents a percentage of recommendation in each category to given previous 
recommendation level 
 
For the entire sample, 64,918 recommendations are reiterations, which is 91.08% of the total. The 
numbers in the triangle above the diagonal represent downgrade recommendations.  
    For instance, 2,986 (in the 2
nd
 row and the 3
rd
 column) represents downgrade recommendations 
from “Buy” to “Hold”. The percentage of this downgrade is 6.9% when previous 
recommendations were “Buy”. Overall, 3,450 recommendations are downgrade recommendations 
(4.84% of total recommendations). On the other hand, the numbers in the triangle below the 
diagonal represent upgrade recommendations. There are a total of the 2,904 upgrades, 146 
recommendations are upgraded from “Buy” to “Strong Buy” and 2,486 recommendations are 
upgraded from “Hold” to “Buy”. Total upgrades represent 4.07% of the total recommendations. 
In this sample, downgrade recommendations are slightly greater than upgrade recommendations. 
The percentages of upgrade and downgrade recommendations are relatively small compared to 
the percentage of reiterations. This table indicates that stock analysts are not likely to change their 
recommendation levels frequently. These results are also consistent with the results reported in 
most previous research. 
    The recommendation sample used in this research includes recommendations issued from 37
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<Table 3-3> Recommendations from chaebol and non-chaebol brokerages 
Brokerage Name Number of Recommendations   
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Percent 
         
Chaebol brokerages 
       
Samsung Securities 284 4800 3037 1577 1606 11304 15.86 
Hyundai Securities 517 2242 2032 1998 1368 8157 11.44 
LG Investment & Securities 52 1291 2177 2004 1553 7077 9.93 
SK Securities 
 
72 736 871 577 569 2825 3.96 
Hanhwa Securities 3 494 384 805 797 2483 3.48 
Total (5 chaebol brokerages) 928 9563 8501 6961 5893 31846 44.67 
         
Non-chaebol brokerages 
       
Dongwon Securities 46 969 1294 2031 1126 5466 7.67 
Tong Yang Securities 184 922 1279 1406 539 4330 6.08 
Shinyoung Securities 59 348 824 1667 1253 4151 5.82 
Korea Investment & Securities 48 842 728 1352 1001 3971 5.57 
Goodmorning Shinhan Securities 64 1113 1240 777 476 3670 5.15 
Woori Investment & Securities 0 2 200 1605 1333 3140 4.41 
Meritz Securities 
 
119 1325 799 537 236 3016 4.23 
Daewoo Securities 183 64 55 1307 1199 2808 3.94 
Daishin Securities 26 261 256 517 489 1549 2.17 
Dongbu Securities 3 42 261 600 208 1114 1.56 
others(22 brokerage firms) 23 706 1525 2300 1657 6211 8.71 
Total (Non-chaebol brokerages) 755 6594 8461 14099 9517 39426 55.31 
                  
         
brokerages. <Table3-3> reports the number of recommendations in the sample by each brokerage 
broken down by year. One of the main concerns in this research is to examine the conflict of 
interest in chaebol brokerages. I divide brokerages into two: the chaebol or the non-chaebol 
brokerage. The five chaebol brokerages are Samsung Securities, Hyundai Securities, LG 
Investment & Securities, SK Securities, and Hanhwa Securities. These five chaebol brokerages 
issue 31,846 recommendations, which represent 44.67% of the total recommendations. In this 
research, I also categorize recommendations based on the size of brokerages: large and small. To 
determine large and small brokerages, I use the number of recommendations from each brokerage 
in each year as a proxy for the size of brokerages, since I would like to measure the size of 
brokerage with the size of research divisions. Initially, I assume that large brokerages produce 
more recommendation reports to the public. However, the number of recommendations issued by 
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each brokerage varied from year to year. Therefore, I use the recommendations by the top six 
brokerages (almost 1/5 of total brokerages) in each year as the large brokerages‟ 
recommendations. For instance, recommendations issued from the Dongwon Securities (the first 
brokerage in Panel B) in 2001, 2002, and 2003 were categorized as recommendations from large 
brokerages and those in 2000 and 2004 were categorized as small brokerages‟ recommendations.  
<Table 3-4> The number of recommendations and the average of recommendation levels 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004   00-04 
A: Large Firms 
       
N 881 8389 9954 13305 10210 
 
42739 
Mean 2.35 2.46 2.31 2.35 2.31 
 
2.35 
B: Small Firms 
       
N 801 7768 7008 7755 5200 
 
28533 
Mean 2.50 2.58 2.41 2.42 2.40 
 
2.46 
        
C: Chaebol Firms 
       
N 409 3800 4338 5811 4522 
 
18880 
Mean 2.36 2.47 2.32 2.36 2.28 
 
2.36 
D: Non_Chaebol Firms 
       
N 1274 12357 12624 15249 10888 
 
52392 
Mean 2.44 2.53 2.36 2.38 2.36 
 
2.41 
        
E: Large Brokerages 
       
N 1359 11740 11059 10882 8312 
 
43352 
Mean 2.48 2.57 2.40 2.44 2.40 
 
2.46 
F: Small Brokerages 
       
N 324 4417 5903 10178 7098 
 
27920 
Mean 2.17 2.38 2.26 2.30 2.28   2.30 
 
    <Table 3-4> presents the numbers of recommendations and the averages of recommendation 
levels in each year. This table reports the numbers and the averages of the recommendation levels 
for large and small covered firms in panels A and B, for Chaebol and Non-Chaebol covered firms 
in panels C and D, and from large and small brokerages in panels E and F. In general, stock 
analysts seem likely to issue more positive recommendations for large covered firms than those 
for small covered firms. The average of recommendations for large covered firms is 2.35 and the 
average for small firms is 2.46. Recommendations issued from small brokerages are more
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favorable than those from large brokerages. They are 2.46 and 2.30 respectively. The differences 
in average of recommendation levels between large and small covered firms or large and small 
brokerages might reflect the bargaining power between covered firms and brokerages.  
    For instance, large brokerages have relatively more bargaining power with covered firms than 
small brokerages, therefore large brokerages are prone to provide less positive recommendations 
than small brokerages provide. In light of brokerages, large covered firms are relatively more 
important than small covered firms, so brokerages are likely to seek good relationship with large 
covered firms by issuing more positive recommendations. In contrast, the averages from Panel C 
and D are not quite different. The difference in averages of recommendation levels is just 0.05. It 
indicates that analysts do not provide significantly different pattern of recommendations between 
chaebol and non-chaebol covered firms. 
 
2. Description of Recommendations from Chaebol Brokerages 
    In the previous section, I formulate two alternative hypotheses. The first one is incentive 
hypothesis, that chaebol brokerages provide more favorable recommendations following their 
incentives. The other is information hypothesis, that chaebol brokerages provide more accurate 
information to obtain reputation in the market. For incentive hypothesis, there are two possible 
cases: upward or downward biased. Chaebol brokerages might issue more favorable 
recommendations if they are compelled by incentives to maximize revenue from the underwriting 
division, to keep good relationships with covered firms, or to increase stock trading. They also 
might issue less favorable recommendations if they are forced by incentive to increase the cost of 
capital for firms which compete with firms in the same chaebol. To examine the differences 
between recommendations from chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages, first I present the 
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<Table 3-5 > Distribution of recommendations from chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages (by year) 
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004   Total 
         
Chaebol brokerages 
      
Strong buy 
 
17 (1.8) 9 (0.1) 117 (1.4) 68 (1.0) 18 (0.3) 
 
229 (0.7) 
Buy 
 
491 (52.9) 4414 (46.2) 4902 (57.7) 3824 (54.9) 3599 (61.1) 
 
17230 (54.1) 
Hold 
 
343 (37.0) 4617 (48.3) 3293 (38.7) 3010 (43.2) 2235 (37.9) 
 
13489 (42.4) 
Sell 
 
77 (8.3) 523 (5.5) 189 (2.2) 59 (0.8) 41 (0.7) 
 
889 (2.8) 
N 
 
928 9563 8501 6961 5893 
 
31846 
Average level 
 
2.52 2.59 2.42 2.44 2.39 
 
2.47 
         
Non-chaebol brokerages 
     
Strong buy 
 
18 (2.4) 62 (0.9) 169 (2.0) 124 (0.9) 70 (0.7) 
 
443 (1.1) 
Buy 
 
521 (69.0) 3968 (60.2) 5794 (68.5) 9143 (64.8) 6467 (68.0) 
 
25893 (65.7) 
Hold 
 
184 (24.4) 2333 (35.4) 2390 (28.2) 4763 (33.8) 2933 (30.8) 
 
12603 (32.0) 
Sell 
 
32 (4.2) 231 (3.5) 108 (1.3) 69 (0.5) 47 (0.5) 
 
487 (1.2) 
N 
 
755 6594 8461 14099 9517 
 
39426 
Average level 
 
2.30 2.41 2.29 2.34 2.31 
 
2.33 
                  
1. Numbers in the parenthesis represent percentage of each level recommendations in each year. 2. Chaebol brokerages are Samsung, LG, Hyundai, SK, and 
Hanhwa securities. 
 
distribution of recommendation levels from chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages. Previous studies 
reported the biased distribution of recommendations as a biased recommendation.  
    <Table 3-5> presents the distribution of recommendation levels from chaebol brokerages or 
non-chaebol brokerages from 2000 to 2004. One of my hypotheses for the distribution of 
recommendation levels from chaebol brokerages is that chaebol brokerages are likely to issue 
upward biased recommendations compared to recommendations from non-chaebol brokerages. 
This appears more likely if the conflict of interest occurs in a chaebol brokerage as in an 
investment bank. Every brokerage has incentives to provide favorable recommendations for 
covered firms in order to keep good relationships with covered firms, in particular to participate 
in the process of IPOs or SEOs or to obtain superior information from covered firms.  
In addition, chaebol brokerages have additional incentives to issue better grade recommendations 
for the purpose of managing the stock prices of the firms in the same chaebol. 
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    In contrast to these hypotheses, this table suggests there is no evidence that chaebol brokerages 
are likely to issue more favorable recommendations. The distribution of recommendations from 
chaebol brokerages indicates that chaebol brokerages tend to provide less favorable 
recommendations than non-chaebol brokerages. In particular, 54.8% of recommendations from 
chaebol brokerages is strong buy or buy level and 45.2% is hold or sell level, while non-chaebol 
brokerage provide 66.8% of strong buy or buy recommendations and 33.2% of hold or sell 
recommendations. The differences in distribution of recommendation levels between chaebol and 
non-chaebol brokerages continue for the entire sample period (from 2000 to 2004). In every year, 
the distribution of recommendations shows chaebol brokerages issuing less favorable 
recommendations than from non-chaebol brokerages. The average of recommendation levels 
from chaebol brokerages is also larger than those from non-chaebol brokerages. The averages of 
recommendation levels are 2.47 for chaebol brokerages and 2.33 for non-chaebol brokerages. The 
higher number imply unfavorable recommendations, since 1 is strong buy, 2 is buy, 3 is hold, and 
4is sell. The averages of recommendation levels from chaebol brokerages are larger than those 
from non-chaebol brokerages in all years of the sample period.  
    The results of <Table 3-5> indicate that chaebol brokerages provide less favorable 
recommendations than non-chaebol brokerages. It might imply that chaebol brokerages are less 
constrained to issue upward biased recommendations by conflict of interest in brokerages. The 
evidence from the distribution of chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations reject the hypothesis that 
chaebol brokerage issue more favorable recommendations. The chaebol brokerages appear to 
provide more accurate recommendations than other brokerages.   
    <Table 3-6> reports the distribution of recommendations for large and small firms from 
chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages. This table presents more detailed distribution of 
recommendations from chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages. The distributions from this table are 
similar to the result of <Table 3-5>. Panel A and B are recommendations for large and small
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<Table 3-6 > Distribution of recommendations from chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages (by 
covered firms’ size) 
    N Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell   Average Level 
         
A: Chaebol brokerages (covered firm=large) 
    
  
17439 142 (0.8) 10241 (58.7) 6734 (38.6) 322 (1.9) 
 
2.41 
         
B: Chaebol brokerages (covered firm=small) 
    
  
14407 87 (0.6) 6989 (48.5) 6764 (47.0) 567 (3.9) 
 
2.54 
         
C: Non-chaebol brokerages (covered firm=large) 
    
  
25300 215 (0.8) 17273 (68.3) 7567 (29.9) 245 (1.0) 
 
2.31 
         
D: Non-chaebol brokerages (covered firm=small) 
    
  
14126 228 (1.6) 8620 (61.0) 5036 (35.7) 242 (1.7) 
 
2.37 
                  
1. Numbers in the parenthesis represent percentage of each level recommendations in each year. 2. Chaebol brokerages are Samsung, LG, Hyundai, SK, and 
Hanhwa securities. 
 
firms from chaebol brokerages and Panel C and D are those from non-chaebol brokerages. For 
large covered firms in Panel A and C, the average of recommendation levels from chaebol 
brokerages are greater than those from non-chaebol brokerages; 2.41 from chaebol brokerages 
and 2.31 from non-chaebol brokerages. Chaebol brokerages issue 59.5% of strong buy/ buy 
recommendations and 40.5% of hold/sell recommendations, whereas non-chaebol brokerages 
issue 69.1% of strong buy/buy and 30.9% of hold/sell recommendations. For small covered firms 
in Panel B and D, the average from chaebol brokerages are also larger than those from non-
chaebol brokerages; 2.54 from chaebol brokerages and 2.37 from non-chaebol brokerages. 
Chaebol brokerages issue 49.1% of strong buy/buy and 50.9% of hold/sell recommendations, 
while non-chaebol brokerages issue 62.6% of strong buy/buy and 38.4% of hold/sell 
recommendations.  
    Overall, I find two things from the result of <Table 3-6>. First, chaebol brokerages provide less 
favorable recommendations than non-chaebol brokerages do, regardless of the size of covered 
firms. This is identical with the results from <Table 3-5>. Second, both types of brokerages tend 
to issue more favorable recommendations for large covered firms than for small 
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covered firms. These results indicate that, in general, chaebol and non-chaebol brokerages are 
more influenced by conflict of interest in issuing recommendations for large firms than in issuing 
recommendations for small firms. This table also indicates that less favorable recommendations 
from chaebol brokerages are not derived from the difference in attitudes for large or small 
covered firms compared to non-chaebol brokerages. 
    <Table 3-7> presents the percentages of recommendation levels. The first graph, presented in 
the left-upper side of the table, shows the percentages of recommendations for covered firms in 
the five chaebol groups and issued by five chaebol brokerages. It indicates that there are 8,060 
recommendations for covered chaebol firms by chaebol brokerages and the average level of those 
recommendations is 2.43. The third graph, which is below the first graph, presents 
recommendations for covered chaebol firms and issued from non-chaebol brokerages. There are 
11,654 recommendations and the average recommendation is 2.32. As this table shows, the 
average level of recommendation for covered chaebol firms (the first and the third graph) are 
slightly lower than those of recommendations for covered non-chaebol firms (the second and the 
fourth graph). However, these differences between the two groups are not significant. The 
average level of recommendation issued by chaebol brokerages (the first and the second graph) 
are greater than those issued by non-chaebol brokerages (the third and the fourth graph). As I 
presented in the previous section, it indicates that non-chaebol brokerages usually issue more 
favorable recommendations than chaebol brokerages issue. One of the main purposes of this 
research is to examine conflict of interest in recommendations for covered chaebol firms and 
chaebol brokerages that are in the same chaebol. I call these types of recommendations as “self-
recommendations”. Chaebol analysts pursue their own goal or the brokerages‟ goal, which are to 
obtain or sustain a good reputation in the stock market by providing accurate recommendations. 
However, they also have to pursue the goals of their chaebols. These goals are connected to the 
benefit of all member firms in the chaebols. This situation presents conflicts of 
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interest for chaebol analysts. Based on this conflict of interest, I hypothesize that analysts in 
chaebol brokerages are reluctant to issue bad recommendations for chaebol firms in the same 
chaebol.  
    To examine the effect from conflicts of interest in chaebol brokerages (or analysts) , I divide 
recommendations covering chaebol firms into three categories; self-recommendations, 
recommendations from other chaebol brokerages, and recommendations from non-chaebol 
brokerages. The self-recommendations stand for recommendations for chaebol firms issued by 
affiliated chaebol brokerages. Other chaebol brokerages‟ or non-chaebol brokerages‟ 
recommendations present recommendations for chaebol firms from unaffiliated chaebol 
brokerages or non-chaebol brokerages. <Table 3-8> suggests that recommendations for chaebol 
firms are classified as three categories mentioned above. This table shows that self-
recommendations have smaller average level of recommendations than other chaebol brokerages‟ 
recommendations. Moreover, chaebol brokerages tend to issue more strong buy recommendations 
for firms in the same chaebol and they are reluctant to issue sell recommendations for firms in the 
same chaebol. Graphs in <Table 3-8> present the percentages of recommendation levels in three 
categories. As we see, the percentage of strong buy from self-recommendation is 3.9% and this 
percentage is significantly higher than those from other chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages. In 
contrast, the percentage of sell from self-recommendation is only 0.2% (only 3 out of 2023 
recommendations) and it is smaller than those from other chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages 
(2.9% and 1.1% respectively). The distribution of self-recommendation levels is consistent with 
the results from Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), which reported that the average 
recommendation level from affiliated analysts are significantly lower (more favorable) than the 
average recommendation level from unaffiliated analysts. The results from <Table 3-8> might be 
evidence that affiliated brokerages tend to issue favorable recommendations to firms which are in 
the same chaebol group. Moreover, these results indicate the existence of conflict of interest in 
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chaebol brokerages. These brokerages tend to issue favorable recommendations for firms in the 
same chaebol group to reduce the cost of capital of those firms and to increase the total market 
value of their group.  
     <Table 3-9> is the recommendation matrix between five chaebol firms and five brokerages. It 
reports the number of recommendations and the average level of recommendations between five 
chaebol groups. The bold numbers which are presented in the diagonal show the number of and 
the average level of self-recommendations that are issued by the brokerage in the same chaebol 
group(affiliated brokerage). The average of recommendation levels from affiliated brokerages are 
lower than the average of the total recommendations presented in the seventh row or the average 
of recommendations from other chaebol brokerages presented in the sixth row. This lower 
average of recommendation level from the affiliated brokerage is consistent with the result from 
<Table 3-8> that affiliated brokerages tend to issue more favorable recommendations to firms 
which are in the same chaebol group. I report the results from t-tests for average recommendation 
levels between the two categories in <Table 3-10>. 
    The difference in means of recommendation levels between group1 (self-recommendation) and 
group2(other chaebols‟ recommendations) is -0.155 and the difference in means is significant at 
the 1% level. It indicates the mean of self-recommendation is significantly smaller than that of 
other chaebols‟ recommendations. The difference in means between group1 and group3 (non-
chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations) is just -0.007 and it is not significant. The difference 
between group2 and group3 are 0.1485 and significant at the 1% level. This t-test might confirm 
the results in <Table 3-8> and <Table3-9> that brokerages in the same chaebol issued more 
favorable recommendations than other chaebol brokerages.  
These results might imply that chaebol brokerages are likely to reduce the cost of capital for firms 
in the same chaebol by publishing favorable recommendations or to increase total market 
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capital of their chaebols. Moreover, chaebol brokerages tend to increase the cost of capital for 
firms in the other chaebols using less favorable recommendations. As a result, chaebol brokerages 
seem to be influenced by conflict of interest in issuing recommendations for the same chaebol 
firms. They try to pursue the incentive where firms in the same chaebol obtain funds with lower 
cost of capital and increase the value of the chaebol rather than to pursue the incentive of 
obtaining a good reputation by accurate recommendations. One more interesting fact is that 
chaebol brokerages are prone to issue less favorable recommendations to other chaebol firms. 
This characteristic of chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations  might be explained by the 
competition between chaebol groups. Chaebol groups compete with each other in many industries 
in Korea and in world markets. Therefore, chaebols do not want their competitor to gain 
advantages from their recommendations. Moreover, chaebols want other chaebol firms to obtain 
funds with higher cost of capital due to their less favorable recommendations.  In light of the 
competition between chaebols, the unfavorable recommendations from other chaebol brokerages 
might be explained.  
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Chapter IV 
Market Response to Recommendations  
from Chaebol or Non-Chaebol Brokerages 
 
1. Results from total recommendations 
1.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs): event-time analysis 
    In this part, I present preliminary empirical results associated with the size of the covered firm, 
the size of the brokerage, and the type of the covered firm (chaebol or non-chaebol) using the 
event-time analysis.  
    To measure cumulative abnormal returns (hereafter called “CARs”), I estimate the abnormal 
returns (ARs) first. To do this, I use a standard event-study methodology suggested by Brown and 
Warner (1985). They presented three models to estimate the abnormal returns: a mean-adjusted 
return model, a market-adjusted return model, and a market and risk-adjusted return model. For 
this study, I use the market-adjusted return model to estimate abnormal returns.  
 Market - Adjusted Return Model 
       , 
where : Daily abnormal return of firm i at date t 
                : Daily stock returns of firm i at date t 
               : The value-weighted index returns at date t. 
The CARs are calculated over various event windows from date t1 to date t2.
tmtiti RRAR ,,, 
tiAR ,
tiR ,
tmR ,
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       , 
where the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of firm i from date t1 to date t2 
    I divide stock analysts‟ recommendations into six categories: upgrade, downgrade, strong buy 
reiteration, buy reiteration, hold reiteration, and sell (or strong sell) reiteration. Panel A in 
<Table4-1> reports the CARs from each category of recommendations. CAR (0, 1) represents the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns during a two-day window which are the event day and the 
following day. The CAR (0, 5) shows the CARs for a six-day window after an event date. If 
recommendations were upgraded, the CAR (0, 1) and the CAR (0, 5) are statistically and 
economically significant excess returns. The CAR (0, 1) is 1.12% for a two-day window and the 
CAR (0, 5) is 1.56% for a five-day window. These equate to 140% and 65% annually (I assume 
that the average of trading days in a year is 250 days). I also display graphs which present the 
CAR (-20, +20). These graphs show the changes in CARs for two months centered by the event 
day. As we see in <Graph4-1>, the CARs of upgraded recommendations (the bold blue line) are 
flat after day 5. This suggests that most of the price reaction due to upgrade recommendations 
might be expected to occur within six days of the event.  
    On the other hand, for down-graded recommendation changes, CAR (0, 1) and CAR (0, 5) are 
also statistically and economically significant. The CAR (0, 1) is -0.85%, the CAR (0, 5) is -
1.16% and these excess returns are 106.3% and 48.3% annually. In <Graph4-1>, the CARs of 
down-graded recommendations (the bold red line) are continuously going down after an event 
day. These statistically significant positive and negative CARs from upgrade and downgrade 
recommendations are consistent with the results from previous papers from Stickel (1995), 
Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2001), Asquith et al. (2005), and Jegadeesh and Kim (2006), etc. 
These significant CARs indicate that upgrade and downgrade recommendation changes convey 
valuable information to stock market participants. These significant CARs also imply that 
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     <Graph 4-1> Averages of CARs from 6 categories of Recommendations      
  
 
           <Graph 4-2> CARs of upgrade for large and small firms                                      <Graph 4-3> CARs of downgrade for large and small firms 
          
 
         <Graph 4-4> CARs of upgrade by large and small brokerages                             <Graph 4-5> CARs of downgrade by large and small brokerages
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        <Graph 4-6> CARs of upgrade for Chaebol and Non-Chaebol                               <Graph 4-7> CARs of downgrade for Chaebol and Non-Chaebol 
       
 
investors will be able to earn excess returns by following these recommendation changes, even 
though stock analysts usually use public information. It may be evidence of stock market 
inefficiency or evidence that stock analysts usually have superior prediction abilities for future 
stock prices.  
    For each level of reiteration, the CARs from reiterations of strong buy show significant 
positive excess returns. The CAR (0, 1) is 0.94%, which corresponds to an annual return of 
117.5%. The excess returns from the strong buy reiterations are similar to those from upgrade 
recommendations. However, most price reaction from the strong buy reiterations appeared within 
this two-day window. This may suggest that the strong buy reiterations have only a very short-
term (two-day window) effect on stock prices. In case of buy reiterations, the CAR (0, 1) and 
CAR (0, 5) are 0.3% and 0.45%; they are 37.5% and 18.8% annually. Although they are 
statistically significant, these CARs mean small investors cannot get economically significant 
excess returns by following these recommendations. For the hold reiterations, CAR (0, 1) and 
CAR (0, 5) are quite small and only CAR (0, 1) is statistically significant at the 5% level. These 
excess returns indicate that they are not economically significant and they are not able to provide 
any value to investors. For the sell reiterations, CARs have significantly negative values. The 
CAR (0, 1) and the CAR (0, 5) are -0.43% and -0.45% respectively and these excess returns
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  result in 53.8% and 18.8% annually.  <Graph4-1> shows that CARs from sell reiterations are 
continuously dropping. This indicates that the duration of effects from negative recommendations 
is relatively long. Panel B and C in <Table4-1> present the CARs from each category of 
recommendations for large and small covered firms. For upgrade recommendations, the CAR (0, 
1) of large firms is 1.04% for a 2-day window, and this positive CAR is increased to 1.64% for a 
6-day window. These CARs are statistically significant and are 130% and 68.3% annually.  On 
the other hand, the CAR (0, 1) of small firms is 1.24% for a 2-day window, which is greater than 
the CAR (0, 1) of large firms. However, this greater positive stock price reaction to upgrade 
recommendations of small firms is reversed for the CAR (0, 5). It is 1.44% and it is smaller than 
those for large firms.  
    Based on the <Graph4-2>, the CARs from upgrade recommendation of small firms decrease 
slightly from 1.44% to 1.11% after day +6. While the differences between CARs of large firms 
and small firms for the short-term period are not significant (only 0.2% for the 2-day window and 
for 6-day window), the excess returns for the 21-day (1 month) window are influenced by the 
firms‟ size in cases of upgrade recommendations. I found that the differences in market reactions 
to upgrade recommendations for large and for small firms occurred 6-days after the 
recommendations changed. It is not consistent with the hypothesis of the marginal information 
effect for small firms. This means that good news for small firms is discounted by investors 
compared to good news for large firms for relatively longer periods, although there is no discount 
for good news for small firms in the (relatively) short-term (2-day or 6-day windows). For 
downgrade recommendations, CAR (0, 1) for large firms is -0.82% for a 2-day window and their 
CAR (0, 5) is -0.95% for a 6-day window. Negative price reactions are concentrated in a 2-day 
window right after recommendation changes for large firms. The CAR (0, 1) and the CAR (0, 5) 
are -0.86% and -1.45% for small firms and these CARs are significant at the 1% level. <Graph4-
3> shows the CARs from downgrade recommendations for large and small firms for a 2-month 
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window. The CAR (0, 20) for small firms is -2.53% and is almost 2.5 times greater than the CAR 
(0, 20), which is only 1.08% for large firms.  
    These results indicate that bad news for small firms is not discounted, whereas good news is 
discounted for small firms. The patterns of CARs for large and small firms are consistent with the 
small firm effects in light of marginal information effects. As we see in <Graph4-2>, the CAR of 
upgrades for large firms is higher than that of small firms after date +4, although this difference 
between the two CAR curves is not statistically significant at 5%. On the other hand, in <Graph4-
3>, the CAR for downgrades of small firms is lower than that for large firms. After the date +4, 
the CAR for small firms continues to drop until date +20. The difference between the CARs of 
large and small firms is 1.45% for 1 month and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. Firm 
size seems to be a determinant of excess returns in a relatively longer term (21-day) window but 
not in a short-term (6-day) window. 
    I find that the price reactions are asymmetric between upgrade and downgrade for small firms. 
For the upgrade for small firms, the discounting of small firm information dominates price 
reactions, whereas marginal information effect dominates price reactions to downgrade for small 
firms. Subsequently, downgrade recommendations for small firms generate greater negative 
CARs than the CARs from downgrade recommendations for large firms. Results for the 
recommendation changes for large and small firms are not consistent with results of previous 
research papers, which reported that analysts‟ recommendations led to larger price reactions for 
small firms than for large firms. In this research, upgrade recommendations for large firms have 
excess returns that are greater than for small firms. These positive excess returns also last longer 
in the large firm sample. Downgrade recommendations for small firms have excess returns and 
this negative effect also persists. Subsequently, it appears that the discounting of information for 
small firms exists in the Korean Stock Market. Many prior papers mentioned that type of analyst 
or brokerage impacts the size of CARs due to recommendation changes. Stickel (1995) reported 
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that recommendation changes by analysts who have good reputations have more influence on 
stock prices and that recommendation changes issued by large brokerage firms have more effect 
on stock prices. Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006) reported there are differences in stock price 
reactions between recommendations issued by reputable investment banks and less reputable 
investment banks.  
    Panel D and E in <Table4-1> shows the CARs for each category of recommendation changes 
issued by large and small brokerages. For upgrade recommendations, the CARs (0, 1) of 
recommendation changes by large and small brokerages are 1.18% and 1.07%. These excess 
returns for a 2-day window are not significantly different. For downgrade recommendations, the 
magnitudes of the CARs (0, 1) from recommendation changes issued by both types of brokerages 
were -0.89% and -0.79%. They are similar, but the CARs (0, 5) for downgrade are -1.36% from 
large brokerages and -0.99% for small brokerages.  <Graph 4-4> and <Graph 4-5> present the 
patterns of CARs from recommendations issued by large or small brokerages. In contrast to the 
CARs (0, 1) for upgrade, the CAR (0, 20) of recommendation changes issued by large brokerages 
is 2.37% for a 21-day window, which is greater than the CAR (0, 20) of recommendation changes 
issued by small brokerages (1.27%). For downgrade recommendations, the patterns of CARs 
from downgrade issued by both types of brokerages are very similar for one month windows.  
    In light of these results from previous studies, my result from upgrade recommendations is 
consistent with the previous studies, in that recommendations issued by reputable analysts or 
large brokerages lead to larger price reactions than price reactions due to recommendations from 
less reputable analysts or small brokerages. However, the results from downgrade are not 
consistent. One possible explanation for the similarity in CARs from large or small brokerages is 
that short-selling is limited in the KSE. Another possible story is that investors do not 
differentiate between recommendations by large brokerages or small brokerages when this
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information is bad news. If investors consider the source of information only in the case of 
positive news, then negative news does not have different effects between recommendations from 
large and small brokerages.  
    Stickel (1995) and Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) reported recommendations about any firms for 
which investors have less information lead to a stronger price reaction than recommendations 
about firms for which investors already have sufficient information. In the KSE, investors usually 
have more information about firms in chaebols. Therefore, I hypothesize that stock price 
reactions to recommendation changes for non-chaebol firms will be greater than those for chaebol 
firms, taking into account that there is more information about chaebol firms available. This study 
uses the five chaebols, such as Samsung, SK, LG, Hyundai, and Hanhwa Groups. I select these 
five chaebols because they have their own brokerages and they are included in the top 10 
chaebols. Chaebol firms are those included in these five chaebols and non-chaebol firms are those 
not included in these five chaebols. 
    Panel F and G in <Table4-1> showed the CARs from recommendations which cover chaebol 
firms and non-chaebol firms. The CARs of upgrade recommendations for Chaebol firms are 
1.14% for a 2-day window and 1.63% for a 6-day window. <Graph 4-6> suggests that an increase 
of positive CARs for chaebol firms appeared only for a relatively short-term window (6-days) and 
a slight decrease of CARs is shown after a 6-day window, even though the CARs for non-chaebol 
firms are continuously increased for a month. For downgrade recommendations, CARs of a 2-day 
window are -0.85% for chaebol firms and -0.83% for non-chaebol firms. In <Graph 4-7>, from 
date 6 to date 20, both the CARs for chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms decrease by 0.21% and 
0.64% respectively. These patterns of CARs are not very different; however, the size of the CARs 
for non-chaebol firms is slightly greater than for chaebol firms. The consistency of the decrease in 
excess returns from downgrade for non-chaebol firms is longer than those for chaebol firms. 
Overall, the CARs for chaebol and non-chaebol firms are not much different for either upgrade or 
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downgrade. It indicates that the difference in the marginal information effects between chaebol 
and non-chaebol firms are not observed, since the effects from recommendation changes for 
chaebol firms are very similar to those for non-chaebol firms. 
1.2 Portfolio returns: calendar-time analysis 
    To determine the price reactions to stock analysts‟ recommendations, this study also uses 
excess returns from buying and one-month holding portfolios. To measure the profit from the 
investment portfolio strategy, I make two sets of portfolios: (1) a strong buy/buy portfolio which 
consist of stocks that were strong buy or buy recommendations, and (2) a hold/sell portfolio 
which consist of stocks that were hold or sell recommendations. I rebalance these portfolios each 
trading day. Each portfolio contains recommendations which are issued from 20-days before to 
the date of the portfolio creation. For instance, the strong buy/buy portfolio in August 30, 2004, 
contains all stocks of strong buy or buy recommendations which are issued from August 2, 2004 
(20 trading days before) to August 30, 2004. I also calculate 1-day or 2-days delayed portfolios. 
In these cases, the strong buy/buy portfolio in August 30, 2004, contains all stocks which are 
recommended as the strong buy or the buy from August 3 or August 4, 2004 to August 30, 2004, 
respectively. If there are multiple buy recommendations for any specific stock, then the portfolio 
include this stock multiple times.  
    To calculate both portfolio returns on date t, I used the following equations: 
(1) 𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝐵 = 
1
𝑁𝐵 ,𝑡
  𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡𝑖𝜖𝐼𝐵 ,𝑡    
(2) 𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝑆 = 
1
𝑁𝑆 ,𝑡
  𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑖𝜖𝐼𝑆 ,𝑡    
    Equation (1) represents the strong buy/buy portfolio return at date t and (2) represents the 
hold/sell portfolio return at date t. The 𝑁𝐵,𝑡  and the 𝑁𝑆,𝑡  represent the number of stocks in each 
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portfolio at date t. The subscript 𝐼𝐵,𝑡  and 𝐼𝑆,𝑡  represent the sets of stocks in the strong buy/buy and 
the hold/sell portfolio, respectively. In equation (1) and (2), I assume the equal-weighted portfolio 
returns. I calculate daily returns from both portfolios, and then I also calculate the daily hedge 
portfolio return for each day. The daily hedge portfolio return (PR
H
t) on date t is the return from 
strong buy/buy portfolio on date t minus the return from hold/sell portfolio on date t. By the 
returns from these three types of portfolio, I compute the daily excess returns by the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) using the following time series regression model (equation(3)). 
(3) 
, ,
,
B S H
t market t tPR R     
    In this equation, the PRt
B,S,H
 represents the hedge portfolio return on date t, while Rmarket,t 
represents the market index return on date t. The intercept (α) of this regression model is the 
CAPM excess return per day. 
    <Table 4-2> represents the daily and annual excess returns from the strong buy/buy, the 
hold/sell, and the hedge portfolios. In panel A, I present the portfolio returns using whole sample 
recommendations. The total recommendations are 71,272: 43,795 for strong buy/buy portfolio 
and 27,477 for hold/sell portfolio. The strong buy/buy portfolio with no delay generates a 
significant excess return of 5 basis points per day. The annual excess returns is calculated by 
daily excess return times 252, since a year is assumed 252 trading days. For the strong buy/buy 
portfolio, the annual excess return is 12.83%. Turning to the hold/sell portfolio, it generates 
significant daily and annual excess returns of -7 basis points and -16.58%, respectively. The third 
portfolio represents the hedge portfolio which is organized by buying the strong buy/buy portfolio 
and short-selling the hold/sell portfolio. The daily excess return is statistically significant and is 
12 basis points. The hedge portfolio strategy produces the significant annual excess return of 
29.48%. I also reporte excess returns from 1- and 2-days delayed portfolios. The
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second row of each portfolio presents excess returns from 1-day delayed portfolio and the third 
row presents excess returns from 2-day delayed portfolio. As expected, excess returns from 
delayed portfolios are smaller than those without a delay, since most stock price reactions 
occurred right after the recommendations are issued. However, both (1-day and 2-day) delayed 
hedge portfolios produce significant positive excess returns from the hedge portfolio. This 
suggests that if investors used 1- or 2-day past recommendations to form hedge portfolios, they 
could earn significant excess returns from this hedge portfolio strategy. Overall, the results from 
the three portfolios suggest that stock analysts‟ recommendations provide valuable information to 
investors, since the excess returns from these three portfolios were statistically significant. 
    From panel B to panel G in <Table 4-2>, I report excess returns from portfolios which I 
compose using 6 different sub-sample of recommendations: (b) for large firms, (c) for small firms, 
(d) from large brokerages, (e) from small brokerages, (f) for chaebol firms, and (g) for non-
chaebol firms. For panel B and panel C, the excess returns from the hedge portfolios with no 
delay in both panels are significant. The excess return from the hedge portfolio consisting of 
small covered firms is two times greater than the excess return from the hedge portfolio of large 
covered firms. The hedge portfolio strategy with small covered firms provides more profitable 
investment opportunities for investors. In the portfolios of large covered firms, the strong buy/buy 
portfolio generates significant daily excess return of 5 basis points, whereas the hold/sell portfolio 
generates insignificant daily excess return of -2 basis points. Turning to the portfolios of small 
covered firms, the daily excess return from the hold/sell portfolio is -11 basis points and 
statistically significant, while the daily excess return from the strong buy/buy portfolio is only 3 
basis points and not significant. The excess returns from the hedge portfolios between large 
covered firms and small covered firms show totally different compositions. The excess return 
from the strong buy/buy portfolio dominates the excess return from hedge portfolio of large 
covered firms and the excess returns from the hold/sell portfolio take a main portion of the excess 
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returns from the hedge portfolio of small covered firms. The excess returns from the 1 or 2-day 
delayed portfolios are also smaller than those from portfolio without delay. These excess returns 
diminished as I form portfolios with longer delays. However, most excess returns from hedge 
portfolios with a delay are statistically significant.  
    For panels D and E, the excess return from the hedge portfolio of recommendations from large 
brokerages is 13 basis points per day and statistically significant. Moreover, this excess returns 
outperform the excess return from the hedge portfolio of recommendations from small brokerages 
by almost 11 basis points per day. As we see, the excess returns from the strong buy/buy and the 
hold/sell portfolios from large brokerages‟ recommendations are 7 basis points and -6 basis points 
per day, respectively, and are also significant, while the daily excess returns from portfolios of 
recommendation from small brokerages are not significant and negligible. I find evidence that 
large brokerages‟ recommendations provide better predictions than small brokerages‟ 
recommendations. The outperformance of large brokerages‟ recommendations might indicate that 
large brokerages have superior skills in gathering and interpreting information for future stock 
prices. The excess returns from portfolios with 1- or 2-day delay are also smaller than those from 
portfolios without delay.  
    Panel F and G present the excess returns from portfolios which consisted of stocks for chaebol 
firms and non-chaebol firms. For the hedge portfolios, the excess returns from the portfolio of 
non-chaebol firms outperform those from the portfolio of chaebol firms. The daily excess returns 
are 12 basis points for the non-chaebol portfolio and 6 basis points for the chaebol portfolio. The 
excess return from the non-chaebol hedge portfolio is statistically significant, while that from the 
chaebol hedge portfolio is not. I find the source of the difference between chaebol and non-
chaebol hedge portfolios in the excess returns from the hold/sell portfolios of both categories. The 
daily excess return from the non-chaebol hold/sell portfolio was -7 basis points and significant, 
whereas that from the chaebol hold/sell portfolio is only -2 basis points and insignificant.
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However, the daily excess returns from strong buy/buy portfolios of chaebol or non-chaebol firms 
are almost identical. The results in panel F and G indicate that stock prices of non-chaebol firms 
are influenced by hold/sell recommendations, while the hold/sell recommendations for chaebol 
firms have little negative influence on stock prices. The excess returns from three portfolios of 
non-chaebol firms decrease with increases in delay, whereas those from portfolios of chaebol 
firms are almost identical, with increases in delay.  
 
2. Results from chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages 
2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs): event-time analysis 
    I calculate the CARs of recommendations from chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages to examine 
the price reactions to chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations. <Table 4-3> reports the CARs of 
recommendations from chaebol brokerages and non-chaebol brokerages. In this table, the CAR (-
20, -1) shows the excess returns for a month before an event date. The CAR (-5, -1) shows the 
CARs for a week before an event date. The CAR (0, 1) shows the CARs for two days after a 
recommendation issued. The CAR (0, 5) shows the CARs for a six-day window after an event 
date. The CAR (0, 20) shows the CARs for a month after an event date. I find interesting 
evidence for price reactions to recommendations from chaebol brokerages. The magnitude of 
CARs of upgrades and downgrades from chaebol brokerages are larger than those from non-
chaebol brokerages. For instance, the CAR (0, 20) of upgrade from chaebol brokerage is 2.6% 
and it is double that of a similar upgrade from non-chaebol brokerage. The absolute value of CAR 
(0, 20) of downgrade from chaebol brokerages is 0.5% greater than that from non-chaebol 
brokerages. Moreover, for immediate price reactions, returns (CAR (0, 1)) for two-day window, 
the price reactions to upgrade and downgrade from chaebol brokerages are slightly larger than
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<Graph 4-8a,b,c,d,e,f> Average CARs of recommendation from chaebol or non-chaebol 
brokerages (by six categories of recommendations)      
     
     
     
61 
 
those of non-chaebol brokerages. The CARs of reiterations from non-chaebol brokerages, in 
contrast, are slightly larger than those from chaebol brokerages. However, the differences in 
CARs of reiterations between chaebol and non-chaebol brokerages are not significant at the 5% 
level except for hold reiterations, as indicated <Graph 4-8.a-f>. These graphs represent CARs and 
95% confidence intervals from chaebol brokerages or non-chaebol brokerages.  
    Overall, recommendation changes from chaebol brokerages have more influence on stock 
prices compared to recommendation changes from non-chaebol brokerages, whereas price 
reactions due to reiterations from chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages are very similar in 
announcement period (CAR (0, 1)) and 1-month period (CAR (0, 20)). The larger price reactions 
to chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations indicate that less favorable recommendations from 
chaebol brokerages look less like a downward biased recommendation but a more accurate 
recommendation. This result is the evidence for the hypothesis of chaebol brokerages‟ accuracy 
in providing recommendations. This result indicates that recommendations from chaebol 
brokerages are more informative to investors than those from non-chaebol brokerages in the case 
of recommendation changes, even though it does not indicate the accuracy and effectiveness of 
chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations for the case of reiterations. This result is also consistent 
with the result of <Table 3-5>. Because chaebol brokerages provide less upward biased 
recommendations, investors might feel that chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations are more 
accurate and informative. As a consequence, price reactions to the recommendations from 
chaebol brokerages are larger than those from non-chaebol brokerages.  
    <Table 4-4> presents the CARs from 4 categories: chaebol brokerage-large firms, chaebol 
brokerages-small firms, non chaebol brokerages-large firms, and non chaebol brokerages-small 
firms. For recommendation changes from chaebol brokerages, recommendations for small firms 
have larger impacts on stock prices than those for large firms. For upgrade by chaebol brokerages, 
the CAR (0, 1) is 1.73% and the CAR (0, 20) is 2.75% for small firms, while the CAR (0, 1) is 
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1.07% and the CAR (0, 20) is 2.5% for large firms. For the case of downgrade, the CAR (0, 1) is 
-0.98% and the CAR (0, 20) is -2.49% for small firms, while the CAR (0, 1) is -0.95% and the 
CAR (0, 20) is -1.71% for large firms. <Table 3-6> suggests chaebol brokerages issue less 
favorable recommendations for large firms than for small firms. Therefore, I hypothesize that the 
price reactions to chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations for large firms are larger than those for 
small firms. However, this result is not consistent with my expectation. For recommendation 
changes from non-chaebol brokerages, the price reactions are not consistent with the implication 
from the distribution of recommendations from non-chaebol brokerages in <Table 3-6>. Upgrade 
for large firms have larger influences on the stock prices than those for small firms. Downgrades 
for large firms have smaller effects on the stock prices than those for small firms. However, I find 
evidence that indicates the reverse relationship between the average level of recommendations 
and the size of price reactions. In general, recommendation changes from chaebol brokerages 
generate greater price reactions than those from non-chaebol brokerages. It indicates that 
recommendations from brokerages which issue less positive recommendations are considered 
more accurate and informative than those from brokerages which issue more positive 
recommendations. It also supports the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the average 
level of recommendation and market price reactions to recommendations. 
2.2 Portfolio Returns: calendar-time analysis 
    I analyze the excess returns from the buy and hold 1-month portfolios: (1) strong buy/buy , (2) 
hold/sell, and (3) hedge portfolios. The daily excess returns, t-statistics and annual excess returns 
are reported in <Table 4-5>.  
    Panel A presents returns from three types of portfolios which are the strong buy/buy, the 
hold/sell, and the hedge portfolios of recommendations by chaebol brokerages. The strong 
buy/buy portfolio and the hold/sell portfolio produce statistically significant excess returns if 
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these portfolios are formed at the date of recommendation issue. These excess returns are +4 and 
-6 basis points per day, respectively. The hedge portfolio returns from chaebol brokerages‟ 
recommendations are large and significant. This return is 10 basis points per day, 2.18% per 
month, and 26.21% per year. The chaebol brokerages‟ portfolio returns, which came from 1- and 
2- day delay portfolios, are 9 and 8 basis points per day. These returns are statistically significant. 
It means that investor should be able to earn excess returns from hedge portfolios of chaebol 
brokerages‟ recommendations, even if they form the portfolio with 1- or 2-day delay.  
    Panel B presents portfolio returns from non-chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations. For the 
portfolio with no delay, the strong buy/buy portfolio return is +5 basis points per day and is 
statistically significant, whereas the hold/sell portfolio return is -1 basis point and is not 
significant. The hedge portfolio returns from non-chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations are 6, 3, 
and 2 basis points per day for no delay, 1-day delay, and 2-day delay portfolios, respectively. The 
portfolio returns from no delay hedge portfolio is only slightly statistically significant and the 
portfolio returns from 1- or 2-day delay are relatively small and are not significant. It means that 
investment opportunity from the hedge portfolio from non-chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations 
disappear within 1 day. These results indicate that the hedge portfolio, which is formed by 
recommendations from chaebol brokerages, produces more excess returns than those from non-
chaebol brokerages. This result also supports that, in general, chaebol brokerages issue more 
accurate and informative recommendations.  
    Panels C and D show the excess portfolio returns of recommendations for large firms between 
chaebol and non-chaebol brokerages. The hedge portfolio from chaebol brokerages‟ 
recommendations generate statistically significant and large excess returns which are +7 basis 
points per day, while excess returns from non-chaebol brokerages‟ hedge portfolio are not 
significant and very small at 3 basis points per day. These results indicate that recommendations 
for large firms from chaebol brokerages are considered as better recommendations by market
66 
 
participants. These results are also consistent with the distribution of recommendations for large 
firms between chaebol and non-chaebol brokerages. They present the negative relationship 
between market price reactions of brokerages‟ recommendations and the average 
recommendation levels of brokerages.  
    Panels E and F present the excess portfolio returns of recommendations for small firms from 
chaebol and non-chaebol brokerages. The hold/sell portfolio from chaebol brokerages generates 
significant excess returns for 0- and 1-day delay. This excess return is 10 basis points per day. 
The portfolios of non-chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations all generated insignificant excess 
returns from each portfolio except the hedge portfolio with a 0-day delay, while portfolios of 
chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations produce excess returns in the hold/sell portfolio and in the 
hedge portfolio. This result also indicates chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations are informative.  
    Overall, chaebol brokerages provide more valuable recommendations to investors than non-
chaebol brokerages. These significant excess returns of portfolios are generated by the entire 
sample of chaebol brokerages. In the sub-sample of large or small covered firms, chaebol 
brokerages also generates more significant excess returns in the large and small firms‟ sub-
samples. This result indicates that investors recognize that chaebol brokerages provide less 
positive recommendations than non-chaebol brokerages. Hence the price reactions to chaebol 
brokerages‟ recommendations are greater than non-chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations. This 
result might support the idea that chaebol brokerages have superior skills for picking prospective 
stocks or that chaebol brokerages provide superior predictions for stock prices by using superior 
information sources. 
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Chapter V 
Market Response to Affiliated or Unaffiliated Recommendations  
from Chaebol Brokerages 
 
 1. CARs of recommendations from Affiliated or Unaffiliated Chaebol Brokerages 
    The main purposes of this chapter is to examine the announcement effects of chaebol firms‟ 
recommendations issued from affiliated or unaffiliated chaebol brokerages. For this purpose, I 
only use recommendations for chaebol firms.  
    <Table 5-1> represents the CARs derived from different levels and changes using 
recommendations for chaebol firms (Samsung, LG, SK, Hyundai, and Hanhwa Group). Panel A 
shows the CARs of recommendations where the current level is strong buy. The first row and the 
second row of Panel A show the CARs of recommendations which are upgrades to strong buy 
and reiterations of strong buy. These CARs show that the CARs from upgrade to strong buy are 
significantly larger than the CARs from strong buy reiterations. The differences of the CARs 
between groups are 1.19% for 2 days, 3.19% for 6 days, 2.8% for 11 days, and 1.75% for 21 days. 
Panel B shows the CARs of current buy recommendations. I divide buy recommendations into 3 
categories which are upgrade to buy, reiteration of buy, and downgrade to buy. As we see, the 
CARs from upgrade to buy are 1.1% for 2 days, 1.63% for 6days, 1.53% for 11 days, and 1.5% 
for 21 days. These CARs are larger than the CARs from buy reiteration and downgrade to buy. 
Panel C shows the CARs from current hold recommendations. The CARs from upgrade are also 
greater than the CARs from downgrade and reiteration. Panel D reports the CARs from current 
sell recommendations. The CARs from downgrade to sell show larger negative numbers than the
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<Graph 5-1a,b,c,d,e,f> Average CARs of recommendations from affiliated or unaffiliated chaebol 
brokerages (by six categories of recommendations)  
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CARs of sell reiterations right after recommendations issued (for 2days, 6 days and for 11days). 
But the CAR of downgrade for the 21-day window (1 month) shows smaller negative numbers 
than the CAR for reiteration.  
    Overall, if current recommendation levels are identical, upgrade recommendations have larger 
positive price reactions than reiterations or downgrade recommendations have. It indicates that 
the magnitude of price reactions due to recommendations are influenced by current level and by 
change of recommendations. This result also indicates that investors not only take current 
recommendation levels into account but also take previous recommendation levels into 
consideration in evaluating analysts‟ recommendations and deciding investments.   
    <Table 5-2> and <Graph 5-1 a,b,c,d,e,f> represent CARs from recommendations from chaebol 
covered firms. As I did in the previous section, I put all recommendations from chaebol covered 
firms into 3 categories; self-recommendation, other chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations, and 
non-chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations. Panel A is the CARs from self-recommendations, 
Panel B is the CARs of recommendations from other chaebol brokerages, and Panel C is the 
CARs of recommendations from non-chaebol brokerages.  
    I find two interesting patterns to the CARs in all three categories. First, the CARs from self-
recommendations are greater than the CARs from other chaebol or non-chaebol brokerages, 
especially for upgrades and strong buy reiterations. <Graph 5-1.a,c> shows patterns of CARs 
from upgrade recommendations and strong buy reiterations. The CARs from upgrade self-
recommendations are almost twice as great as the CARs of upgrades from other chaebol 
brokerages‟ recommendations for all windows after the event date (day 0). The CAR (0, 1) of 
upgrade from self-recommendations are 2.23% and those from other chaebol brokerages‟ 
recommendations are 1.27%. The CAR (0, 20) from self-recommendations are 3.49% and those 
from other chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations are 1.80%. The CAR (0, 20) of downgrade 
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from self-recommendations are 2.88% and those from other chaebol brokerages‟ 
recommendations are 1.80%. These results are not consistent with previous results where price 
reactions to recommendations are greater as the average recommendation level increases. In the 
case of self-recommendations, the price reactions from self-recommendations are greater than 
those from other recommendations, whereas average level of self- recommendations present more 
favorable ratings than those of other brokerages‟ recommendations.  
    This puzzling result may be explained by two things. First, conflicts of interest in self-analysts 
could explain this puzzling result. Self-analysts have incentives to provide good news for firms in 
the same chaebol as fast as possible. If they provide this kind of information too quickly, then 
self-recommendations are more informative than other brokerages‟ recommendations in light of 
timing of information. This idea also explains the upward biased distribution of self-
recommendation levels. If self-analysts keep silent when they have bad information for affiliated 
chaebol firms, then they issue a relatively small number of negative rating (hold or sell) 
recommendations and the average of self-recommendation level is lower (more favorable) than 
those of other brokerages‟ recommendations. Secondly, based on the hypothesis of superior 
information, self-analysts obtain more accurate information and predict more accurate prospects. 
As a result, self-analysts‟ recommedations have greater price reactions compared to price 
reactions from other brokerages‟ recommendations, since self-recommendation provides superior 
and accurate information.  
    The second interesting pattern is that the negative price reactions from downgrade self-
recommendation are delayed by 2 weeks. The average CARs of downgrade from three categories 
show very similar patterns. The decreases of these CARs mainly occurred in a two-day window. 
However, the average CAR from self-recommendations drop one more time ten days after 
recommendation downgrade. So, the CARs from other chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations
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or non-chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations show somewhat different patterns from the CARs 
from self-recommendations.  
    To examine whether self-analysts provide accurate recommendations, I report the distribution 
of the excess returns by recommendation levels. <Table 5-3> reports the average CARs for a one 
month period and the distribution of the CAR from each recommendation level between two 
categories: self-recommendations and other chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations. For strong 
buy recommendations, I observe that 60.3% of self-recommendations made positive CARs for 
one month, whereas only 48.8% of other chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations earned positive 
CARs over the one month (21-days) window after the recommendation‟s issue. Moreover, 24.4% 
of strong buy self-recommendations generate excess returns greater than 10%, whereas only 
14.0% of other chaebol brokerages‟ strong buy recommendations generate excess returns greater 
than 10%. For other levels, I do not observe any significant differences in the distributions of 
CARs between self-recommendations and other chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations. The 
average CARs of strong buy from self-recommendations is 1.57% for the 1-month window, and 
this return is significantly greater than the -0.66% average CARs from strong buy using other 
chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations. 
    This result might indicate that analysts in a chaebol brokerage have superior abilities to choose 
stocks of affiliated chaebol firms. This may be due to the fact that the self-analysts are able to 
access inside information sources for affiliated chaebol firms and the self-analysts usually tend to 
convey only good information to the public, while they also have bad information for the firms in 
the same chaebol. I think this result also explains the differences in CARs of upgrade and strong 
buy reiteration between self-recommendations and other chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations 
in the <Table 5-2>. If analysts at affiliated chaebol brokerages have a superior ability to access 
and evaluate information for affiliated chaebol firms, and they are likely to provide only good 
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information to the public, then their recommendations have greater effects on the stock prices 
only in the case of good news. 
    <Table 5-4> presents the CARs from recommendations for chaebol firms in an earnings report 
period. Firms listed in the KSE should announce their earnings reports four times a year; annually, 
semi-annually, and two quarterly reports. These earnings reports provide information about 
prospective firms and reduce uncertainty of firms‟ profitability. If any recommendations are 
issued following these earnings reports, then we can presume that recommendations might reflect 
new information in the earning reports. Because these recommendations reflect new information 
in the earnings reports, they are viewed as more informative than other recommendations. In this 
table, I divide recommendations into two categories; issued in the earnings report period and 
issued in the non-earnings report period. If any recommendations are issued in the date of 
earnings reports or the two following days, then I regard these recommendations as 
recommendations over the earnings report period.  
    The CARs from chaebol firms during the earnings report period( CAR (0, 1), CAR (0, 5), CAR 
(0, 10), and CAR (0, 20)) are not statistically significant, whereas those during non-earnings 
report period are significant in the categories of an upgrade, a downgrade, and a strong buy 
reiteration. However, the CAR (-20, -1) and CAR (-5, -1) from chaebol firms in the earnings 
report period are significant for upgrade, buy reiteration, and sell reiteration. Moreover, these 
CARs are greater than those in the non-earnings report period. These price reactions before the 
earnings report is officially released suggest that a leakage of earnings reports for chaebol firms is 
more serious than those for non-chaebol firms. The CARs from non-chaebol firms in the earnings 
report period are statistically significant, especially for upgrade and strong buy reiterations, even 
though those from chaebol firms are not. It might imply that the earnings reports and the 
recommendations for chaebol firms do not provide significantly new information to investors. By 
a leakage of earnings reports, if investors already have enough information for
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chaebol firms or investors expect the content of the earnings report, then earnings reports and 
recommendations for chaebol firms are not valuable for investors, whereas earnings reports and 
recommendations for non-chaebol firms provide valuable information. In general, investors 
obtain various types of informations from chaebol firms. Therefore, they are able to evaluate and 
interpret the earnings reports of chaebol firms relatively well. In contrast, the additional 
information is more effective in non-chaebol firms which are relatively less well-known to 
investors than chaebol firms which are well known. It might be evidence of the marginal effect of 
information between chaebol and non-chaebol firms.   
    To examine whether chaebol brokerages have superior information on firms in the same 
chaebol or whether chaebol brokerages provide information faster than other brokerages do, I 
analyze the leading and following recommendations from different brokerages. <Table 5-5> 
reports the CARs from the leaders‟ and the followers‟ recommendation changes. To identify the 
leaders‟ and followers‟ recommendation changes, first I extract recommendations which covered 
firms in the five chaebol groups from my full sample. Additionally, I select recommendation 
changes which are self-recommendations and followed by other chaebol brokerages‟ 
recommendations within 10-day or 20-day windows. If both of the self-recommendation and 
other chaebol brokerages‟ recommendation show the same recommendation change, then I 
categorize self-recommendation changes as the leader‟s recommendation and the other chaebol 
brokerage recommendation as the follower‟s recommendation.  
    <Table 5-5> indicates that six self-recommendation changes are followed by other chaebol 
brokerages‟ recommendation changes in the 10-day period, and 9 self- recommendation changes 
are categorized as leader‟s recommendations in the 20-day period. The CARs from leader‟s 
upgrade recommendations (self-recommendations) are significant and are greater than the CARs 
from the follower‟s upgrade recommendations. However, I do not observe any significant
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CARs from leader‟s and follower‟s downgrade recommendations. These results might indicate 
that self-analysts usually have superior skills to predict stock prices or have superior information 
sources for firms in the same chaebol group. However, because the number of observations used 
in this analysis are relatively small, this result does not strongly support the hypothesis that 
affiliated chaebol brokerages have superior skills or information sources. 
 
2. Portfolio returns of recommendations from affiliated or unaffiliated chaebol brokerages  
    In the dataset, there are 19,714 recommendations for covered firms in the five chaebol groups 
(Samsung, LG, SK, Hyundai, and Hanhwa Group). As I do in the previous section, I partition 
these recommendations into 3 categories by the relationship between brokerages and covered 
firms: self-recommendations, other chaebol brokerage recommendations, and non-chaebol 
brokerage recommendations.  
    <Table 5-6> reports the excess portfolio returns from three types of portfolios which are 
categorized by relationship between covered firm and brokerage: self-brokerage, other chaebol 
brokerages, and non-chaebol brokerages. Only the excess return of the hedge portfolio from self-
recommendation is statistically significant. The excess return is 12 basis points per day, 2.58% 
per month, and 30.24% per year. Alternatively, all excess returns from the hedge portfolios of 
other chaebol brokerage and non-chaebol brokerage are not significant. 
    I find two interesting things from portfolio excess returns analysis. The first thing is that the 
daily excess return with no delay in the panel A was 50% greater than those in the panel B and C 
for the strong buy/buy portfolio. This result is consistent with the results from the <Table 5-
2>where the CARs of upgrades, strong buy reiterations, and buy reiterations from self- 
recommendations are larger than those from other chaebol brokerage recommendations and non- 
chaebol brokerage recommendations. For the case of strong buy/buy portfolio, the larger 
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excess returns from self-recommendations support the hypothesis that self-analysts have superior 
skills to access data and to predict stock prices for firms in the same chaebol group.  
    The second thing is that the hold/sell portfolio of the self-recommendations generated negative 
daily excess return (-7 basis points) from the no delay portfolio, whereas the hold/sell portfolios 
in the panel B and C generate almost 0% daily excess returns. As we see in the <Table 3-8>, self-
analysts are reluctant to issue a sell recommendation for the same chaebol firms. The self analysts 
provide sell recommendations for 0.2% of the 2,023 self-recommendations and the average level 
of recommendations from the self-analysts are lower (more favorable) than that from other 
chaebol brokerage recommendations. This negative return from hold/sell portfolio of self-
recommendations implies that stock market participants react more to hold and sell from self-
recommendations than those from other chaebol brokerage recommendations. This negative price 
reaction from self-recommendations might be explained by conflicts of interest. The negative 
excess returns are stronger if investors recognize the conflicts of interest in self-analysts‟ 
recommendations which tend to be more favorable. Therefore, investors perceive that self-
analysts‟ sell (or hold) recommendations convey more negative information than other analysts‟ 
recommendations. As a result, investors respond more to sell (or hold) from self-analysts than to 
those from other types of analysts.  
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
Chapter VI 
Market Response to Anticipated or Unanticipated Recommendations 
 
1. Probability expectation model 
1.1 Ordered Logit Model (OLM) 
    The first method that this paper uses to predict the probabilities of recommendation changes is 
the ordered logit model. The ordered logit model is the generalization of the logistic regression 
model to the case where the dependent variable has more than two outcomes and where the 
outcomes are ordered. In this model, the dependent variable is a recommendation change and can 
take 3 categorical values which are upgrade, downgrade, and reiteration. In an ordered logit 
model, we usually use the category which has the most observations as a reference category. This 
ordered logit model is the multi-equation model. This means that a dependent variable with K 
categories will generate K - 1 equations. For instance, recommendation changes which have 3 
categorical values simultaneously estimate 2 equations through the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE).  
    To figure out the probability of each category for recommendation i, I initially run the ordered 
logistic model. Recommendation changes are upgrade, downgrade, and reiteration and I use 
reiteration as the reference category. Then I have two logit functions, one for upgrade versus 
reiteration and another for downgrade versus reiteration. In total, I obtain three sets of βs. Two 
sets of βs are derived from the two logit functions I obtain and the other set is derived from the 
assumption of the reference category. All the values of the βs in the set from the reference 
category are zeros. This model assumes that the log-odds of each observation i follow a linear 
model:
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=  =  , 
where is a constant and is a vector of regression coefficients, for j=1 (upgrade) and 2 
(downgrade) and j=3 (reiteration) which is a reference category. 
    Second, I calculate the probabilities of each category for each observation i using the following 
equations. The probability ( ) of recommendation i and categories j is  
 =    ,   for j=1, 2, and 3 , 
where exp ( )=1, since we use this category as a reference category.  
We can also express the probabilities for each i and j 
 a) Probability (y=upgrade) = exp ( ) / {exp ( ) + exp ( ) + exp ( )}  
 b) Probability (y=downgrade) = exp ( ) / {exp ( ) + exp ( ) + exp ( )}  
 c) Probability (y=reiteration) = exp ( ) / {exp ( ) + exp ( ) + exp ( )}  
According to the characteristics of the ordered logit model, the sum of the probabilities of all 
categories for any observation i will be equal to one. 
 
1.2 Ordered Probit Model (OPM) 
    The second method used to calculate the probabilities of recommendation changes is the 
ordered probit model. If the dependent variable (recommendation change) is an ordered response, 
then we can use this model to predict probabilities of recommendation changes. In this study, I 
am able to consider recommendation changes as an ordered variable, such as downgrade, 
reiteration, and upgrade. In an ordered probit model, the probabilities of the dependent variable 
are calculated as a linear function of the independent variables plus the set of cut points. I obtain 
estimates of cut points which are the estimated values dividing the categories (1, 2, and 3)
ji,
Ji
ji
,
,
log


jij x  
j j
ji,
ji,
 
J
k ki
ji
1 ,
,
}exp{
}exp{


3,i
1,i 1,i 2,i 3,i
2,i 1,i 2,i 3,i
3,i 1,i 2,i 3,i
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of the dependent variable. 
Φ 𝛾𝑖 ,𝑗    , where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
    I calculated the probabilities of each category j for each observation i using the following 
equations. 
 a) Probability (y=downgrade) = 1- Φ 𝛾𝑖 ,2    
 b) Probability (y=reiteration) =  Φ 𝛾𝑖 ,2  - Φ 𝛾𝑖 ,3  
 c) Probability (y=upgrade) = Φ 𝛾𝑖 ,3  
 
2. Summary of Estimates from Two Models 
2.1 Estimates from Ordered Logit Model(OLM) 
    The logistic regression analysis is often used to derive the relationship between the separate 
dependent variable and the independent variables. In this research, I use recommendation changes 
as the discrete dependent variable and I also use four independent variables. In essence, I am able 
to use the ordered logit model to calculate probabilities for an upgrade, a downgrade, and a 
reiteration.  
    <Table 6-1> shows the results of the ordered logistic regression. The dependent variable is the 
change of recommendation level. Three possible outcomes of recommendation changes are 
upgrade, downgrade, and reiteration. I used the reiteration category as the baseline category, since 
most recommendations are in that category (91.1% of total recommendations). This research uses 
four independent variables to generate estimates. They are the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns 
before the event date (CAR (-5, -1)), the level of previous recommendation (Lag_Rank), the 
dummy variable of chaebol firm (CF), and the log of market capital at the event date (Log(MC)). 
 
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The estimates from the ordered logit model are statistically significant at the 1% level except for 
the dummy variable of chaebol firm. 
<Table 6-1> Estimates from Ordered Logit Model and Ordered Probit Model 
    Ordered Logit Model   Ordered Probit Model 
Independent Variable 
 
Estimates Wald χ2 
 
Estimates Wald χ2 
         
Intercept 1  -12.9538 2322.1 
a 
 -6.4661 2532.4 
a 
Intercept 2 
 -5.6907 494.5 
a 
 -2.5433 426.0 
a 
CAR (-5,-1) 
 1.7972 71.0 
a 
 0.8193 62.7 
a 
Lag_Rank 
 2.1579 5210.0 
a 
 1.0671 5205.4 
a 
CF 
 -0.0474 2.0   -0.0232 2.2  
Log (MC) 
 0.1479 274.7 
a 
 0.0694 266.8 
a 
                  
(a) a,b,and c indicate significance better than the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
(b) Total N=71272 
(c) CAR(-5,-1) represent cumulative abnormal returns from day -5 to day -1, Lag_Rank represents previous rank of recommendations 
issued from the same brokerage firm for the same covered stock, CF is a dummy variable for Chaebol firms,  and Log(MC) represents log 
of market capital for a covered firm at each event day. 
(e) Category 1 is upgrade, Category 2 is reiteration, and Category 3 is downgrade. 
 
    To calculate the probability of each category (upgrade, downgrade, or reiteration) for each 
recommendation, this research uses the parameters from the ordered logit model. According to 
the implication of the ordered logit model, the dependent variable is the recommendation change, 
and I assume that the recommendation changes are ordered. I divide recommendations into three 
groups according to probabilities of upgrade, downgrade, and reiteration. Then I assign 
recommendations into an upgrade-anticipated recommendation group if the probability of 
upgrade from any recommendations is in the top 10%. The number of recommendations in this 
group is 7,127 and the cut-off probability for upgrade is 0.0929(greater than 9.29% for the 
upgrade).  
    I also assign any recommendations having the probability of downgrade in the top 10% into the 
downgrade-anticipated recommendation group. The number of recommendations in the 
downgrade-anticipated group is 7,127 and the cut-off probability of downgrade is 0.0798(7.98% 
for the downgrade). Finally, I assign any recommendations that are not in either group into a 
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reiteration-anticipated group. This reiteration-anticipated group has 57,018 recommendations 
which represent 80% of total recommendations. 
2.2 Estimates from Ordered Probit Model(OPM) 
    The ordered probit analysis is a method that estimates discrete dependent variables which are 
ordered. I consider this method in my research, since recommendation changes are considered as 
ordered values, like an upgrade, a reiteration, and a downgrade.  
    <Table 6-1> shows parameter estimates from the ordered probit model. The dependent variable 
is the recommendation change and I assume that the recommendation changes are ordered. I also 
use the same independent variables as the ordered logit model used. The independent variables 
are the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns before the event date (CAR (-5, -1)), the level of 
previous recommendation (Lag_Rank), the dummy variable of chaebol firm (CF), and the log of 
market capital at the event date (Log(MC)). According to the <Table6-1>, all estimates are 
statistically significant at the 1% level except the dummy variable of chaebol firm (CF).  
    Using these parameter estimates, first I calculate probabilities of an upgrade, a reiteration, and 
a downgrade for each recommendation i, and second, I divide recommendations into three groups 
that were upgrade-anticipated, reiteration-anticipated, and downgrade-anticipated. The numbers 
of recommendations in each group were 7,129, 57,015, and 7,128, respectively. The cut-off 
probability for the upgrade-anticipated group is 0.0924(9.24%) in the probability to upgrade and 
that for the downgrade-anticipated group is 0.0881(8.81%) in the probability to downgrade. I 
assign any recommendations which are not in either group into the reiteration-anticipated group. I 
present the actual recommendation changes for each group implied by the two models used to 
calculate the probabilities of recommendation changes in <Table 6-2>.  
    <Table 6-2> shows that the number of actual recommendation changes are very similar in each 
group calculated by both models used in this section. Additionally, all results and
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<Table6-2> Changes of recommendations by each anticipated group 
    Changes of Recommendations 
  
UP Down  Reiteration 
Panel A: OLM 
   
Upgrade anticipated  
(N=7127) 
1089(15.3%) 31(0.5%) 6007(84.2%) 
Downgrade anticipated 
(N=7128) 
24(0.4%) 806(11.3%) 6298(88.3%) 
Reiteration anticipated 
(N=57017) 
1791(3.1%) 2613(4.6%) 52613(92.3%) 
     
Panel C: OPM 
   
Upgrade anticipated  
(N=7129) 
1086(15.2%) 31(0.5%) 6012(84.3%) 
Downgrade anticipated 
(N=7128) 
26(0.4%) 804(11.3%) 6298(88.3%) 
Reiteration anticipated 
(N=57015) 
1792(3.1%) 2615(4.6%) 52608(92.3%) 
  a. Dependent variable is the change of recommendations, such as an upgrade, a downgrade, and a reiteration. 
 
implications from the two models are similar. This table presents unanticipated recommendation 
changes using bold numbers and anticipated recommendation changes using non-bold numbers. 
For 2,904 actual upgrade recommendations, 1,086 recommendations are anticipated to upgrade 
and 1,818 recommendations are anticipated to downgrade or reiterate before the upgrade 
recommendations issued. For 3,450 downgrade recommendations, 2,646 recommendations are 
unanticipated and 804 recommendations are anticipated. Only 11.3% of downgrade 
recommendations are anticipated correctly by these models, whereas 15.3% of upgrade 
recommendations are correctly expected. These models provide more correct expectations for 
upgrade recommendations than those for downgrade recommendations. 
 
3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) from anticipated or unanticipated 
recommendation changes 
    This research examine the announcement effects between anticipated and unanticipated 
recommendations. I measure price reactions to recommendation changes using the CARs for 2-
day, 6-day, and 21-day windows after recommendation issuance.  
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    <Table 6-3> represents CARs for each window from anticipated and unanticipated 
recommendation changes. I will explain results from the ordered probit model, since the results 
from both models used in this section are very similar. The CARs of upgrade recommendation 
changes which are anticipated are 0.69% for the 2-day window, 0.62% for the 6-day window, and 
0.51% for the 21-day window, respectively. The magnitude of CARs are relatively small and 
CAR (0, 20) is not significant. These CARs decline slightly as the window period increases. On 
the other hand, CARs of upgrade recommendation changes which are unanticipated were 1.37%, 
2.12%, and 2.51%. The differences of CARs between anticipated and unanticipated 
recommendations are 0.68% for the 2-day window, 1.5% for the 6-day window, and 2% for the 
21-day window. These differences of CARs represent  85%, 62.5%, and 23.8% of excess returns 
annually. For the downgrade cases, the CARs of anticipated recommendation changes are -0.77%, 
-0.77%, and -1.16% sequentially. However, the CARs of unanticipated downgrade 
recommendations are -0.85%, -1.28%, and -1.85%. The differences between the two groups of 
recommendation downgrades are 0.08%, 0.51%, and 0.69%. These differences represent 10%, 
21.3%, and 8.2% of excess returns annually. According to these CARs from anticipated or 
unanticipated recommendation changes, the CARs from upgrade recommendations which are 
unanticipated are almost five times greater than the CARs from upgrade recommendations which 
are anticipated over a one month window (21-day), whereas those from unanticipated downgrade 
recommendations are only 50% greater than those of anticipated downgrade recommendations 
over a one month window.  
    I find that unanticipated recommendation changes seem likely to provide more valuable 
information than anticipated changes. That is, the price reactions due to unanticipated changes are 
much stronger  than those due to anticipated changes. 
    As a result, the anticipation for stock recommendation changes is a determinant of the 
magnitude of stock price reactions due to recommendation changes. The differences in the size of
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<Table6-3> CARs from anticipated or unanticipated recommendation changes 
 
N CAR(0,1) t-value CAR(0,5) t-value CAR(0,20) t-value 
Expectation Model: Ordered Logit Model 
   
Upgrade(N=2904) 
     
anticipated 1089 0.0070 5.04 a 0.0062 2.56 b 0.0050 1.30 
Unanticipated 1815 0.0137 12.26 a 0.0213 12.45 a 0.0252 8.87 a 
Downgrade(N=3450) 
       
anticipated 806 -0.0075 -4.40 a -0.0074 -2.86 a -0.0110 -2.64 a 
Unanticipated 2644 -0.0086 -9.50 a -0.0129 -9.03 a -0.0187 -8.08 a 
        
Expectation Model: Ordered Probit Model 
   
Upgrade(N=2904) 
       
anticipated 1086 0.0069 4.99 a 0.0062 2.56 b 0.0051 1.33 
Unanticipated 1818 0.0137 12.29 a 0.0212 12.42 a 0.0251 8.83 a 
Downgrade(N=3450) 
       
anticipated 804 -0.0077 -4.58 a -0.0077 -2.98 a -0.0116 -2.77 a 
Unanticipated 2646 -0.0085 -9.40 a -0.0128 -8.95 a -0.0185 -8.00 a 
                
1. a, b, and c indicate significance better than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
 
CARs from anticipated or unanticipated recommendation changes indicate that the effects from 
unanticipated upgrade recommendation changes are stronger than those from unanticipated 
downgrade recommendation changes. This asymmetric price reaction to unanticipated upgrade or 
downgrade recommendations might arise from the limitation of short-sales in the stock market. In 
general, the short-sale is not commonly used in actual stock trading, whereas purchasing stock is 
relatively common and easy. Investors are not able to use a short-sale method even if they have 
negative information for a covered firm. However, they are able to purchase stocks if they have 
more favorable information. 
     <Graph 6-1a> and <Graph 6-1b> present the means of the CARs from anticipated or 
unanticipated recommendation changes. <Graph 6-1a> represents the mean of the CARs from 
anticipated and unanticipated upgrades. This graph shows that price reactions to recommendation 
changes are different between the two groups; anticipated and unanticipated. The CARs from 
unanticipated recommendation changes are much greater than those from anticipated changes
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 and their differences are statistically significant after recommendation changes are issued. 
<Graph 6-1b> represents the mean of the CARs from anticipated or unanticipated downgrades. 
The CARs from anticipated and unanticipated downgrade recommendations are not much 
different after recommendations changed even though the patterns of CARs are quite different 
between the two groups before recommendations changed. 
<Graph 6-1a,b> CARs from anticipated or unanticipated recommendation changes             
          
    I am able to speculate the reasons why these CARs are not different after recommendation 
changes. It might be explained by the limitation of short-sale in actual trading. If there are 
limitations for short-sales in the stock market, then the stock prices are insignificantly influenced 
by unanticipated downgrade recommendations as much as the CARs from unanticipated upgrade 
recommendations. For instance, if the investors are not able to sell a stock which has 
unanticipated downgrade recommendations using short-selling, then unanticipated downgrade 
recommendations are not able to influence stock prices as much as unanticipated upgrade 
recommendations are. Accordingly, the CARs from anticipated or unanticipated downgrade 
recommendation  might be similar. 
    As in <Table 6-3>, <Graph 6-1a>, and <Graph 6-1b>, I find evidence that anticipation for 
recommendation changes categorized by the ordered logit model or the ordered probit model is 
one of the factors which determine the magnitude of stock price reactions to recommendation 
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changes. The result from upgrade recommendations is consistent with my assumption that the 
CARs from unanticipated recommendation changes are greater than the CARs of anticipated 
recommendation changes. It also implies that investors in the stock market distinguish the type of 
information, whether it is anticipated or unanticipated. 
 
4. Portfolio Returns from Anticipated or Unanticipated Recommendation Changes 
    <Table 6-4> presents portfolio returns from anticipated or unanticipated recommendation 
changes. I categorize recommendation changes into two categories: anticipated or unanticipated 
changes. I also use probabilities for an upgrade or a downgrade used in <Table 6-3> to 
distinguish anticipated or unanticipated changes. For instance, the total number of the upgrade 
recommendation were 2,904. Recommendations in anticipated upgrade portfolio were 1,089 and 
those in unanticipated upgrade portfolio are 1,815. The portfolio returns from anticipated upgrade 
recommendations are not statistically significant. However, portfolio returns from unanticipated 
upgrade recommendations are statistically significant for no delay and 1-day delay portfolios. The 
excess returns for a year are 26.96% and 19.41% of the no delay and the 1-day delay portfolio, 
respectively. The excess return from 2-day delay portfolio from unanticipated upgrade 
recommendations is insignificant.  
    These returns indicate that the opportunity of excess returns from unanticipated upgrade 
recommendations might be valid for 2 days after recommendation upgrade. This opportunity 
disappear relatively fast. One more interest thing about portfolio returns is the excess returns of 
the anticipated downgrade recommendation portfolio without delay. The excess returns from this 
portfolio without delay are 9 basis points per day and 21.84% per year. These returns are 
statistically significant, whereas excess returns from anticipated downgrade recommendation 
portfolios with 1-day delay or 2-day delay are insignificant. These portfolio returns indicate that
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<Table 6-4> Portfolio returns from anticipated or unanticipated recommendation changes 
    CAPM excess return 
 
Delay 
Average abnormal 
daily return (%) 
t-statistic  return(1 month) Return (1 year) 
Panel A: Upgrade Recommendations 
   
(1) Expected Upgrade 0 0.04% 0.91 0.90% 10.80% 
 
1 0.02%  0.37 0.37% 4.43% 
 
2 -0.01%  -0.13 -0.13% -1.58% 
(2) Unexpected Upgrade 0 0.11% 2.52 a 2.25% 26.96% 
 
1 0.08% 1.81 b 1.62% 19.41% 
 
2 0.05% 1.24 1.12% 13.39% 
      
Panel B: Downgrade Recommendations 
  
(1) Expected Downgrade 0 -0.09% -2.03 b -1.82% -21.84% 
 
1 -0.06%  -1.39 -1.24% -14.93% 
 
2 -0.03%  -0.75 -0.67% -7.99% 
(2) Unexpected Downgrade 0 -0.13%  -2.69 a -2.63% -31.50% 
 
1 -0.10%  -2.12 b -2.05% -24.61% 
 
2 -0.07%  -1.47 -1.42% -17.09% 
            
1. a, b, and c indicate significance better than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
 
downgrade recommendation (bad news) usually has significant effects on stock price in the 
relative short-term, although a downgrade recommendation is anticipated. Moreover, excess 
returns from downgrade recommendation portfolios are larger than those from upgrade 
recommendation portfolios. It means that downgrade recommendations might provide better 
quality information or better investment opportunity to investors. 
 
5. Pooled Regression Analysis 
    To ensure the price reactions to recommendation changes in the preceding analysis, this 
research uses a pooled regression analysis. I use the following regression model separately for 
CARs of upgrade and downgrade recommendations.   
= + + + α3 CHAEBOLi,t +  ),( 21 ttCARi 0 tiSIZEF ,1 _ tiSIZEBRK ,2 _ tiUNEXP ,4
93 
 
<Table 6-5> Determinants of the CARs of upgrade and downgrade recommendations 
    CAR(0,1)   CAR(0,5)   CAR(0,10)   CAR(0,20) 
Independent 
Variable   
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-value   
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-value   
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-value   
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-value 
Upgrade Recommendations(N=2904) 
          
Intercept 
 
0.0057 2.42 b 
 
-0.0026 -0.69 
 
-0.0070 -1.51 
 
-0.0169 -2.75 a 
F_SIZE 
 
0.0004 0.19 
 
0.0085  2.68 a 
 
0.0150  3.86 a 
 
0.0233  4.51 a 
BRK_SIZE 
 
0.0010 0.55 
 
0.0023  0.80 
 
0.0030  0.86 
 
0.0117  2.54 b 
CHAEBOL 
 
0.0014 0.68 
 
0.0016  0.48 
 
-0.0039  -0.98 
 
-0.0079 -1.48 
UNEXP 
 
0.0071 3.65 a 
 
0.0184  5.90 a 
 
0.0231  6.08 a 
 
0.0273 5.39 a 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.0038 
  
0.0109 
  
0.0129 
  
0.0136 
 
             
Downgrade Recommendations(N=3450) 
         
Intercept 
 
-0.0074 -3.89 a 
 
-0.0078 -2.66 a 
 
-0.0084 -2.27 b 
 
-0.0157 -3.29 a 
F_SIZE 
 
0.0007  0.41 
 
0.0077  2.70 a 
 
0.0140 3.90 a 
 
0.0196  4.25 a 
BRK_SIZE 
 
-0.0010 -0.64 
 
-0.0033 -1.32 
 
-0.0023 -0.71 
 
-0.0011 -0.27 
CHAEBOL 
 
-0.0003 -0.15 
 
0.0002  0.08 
 
0.0014 0.36 
 
0.0019  0.39 
UNEXP 
 
-0.0012 -0.55 
 
-0.0089 -2.75 a 
 
-0.0163 -4.03 a 
 
-0.0164  -3.15 a 
Adjusted R2 
 
-0.0009 
  
0.0027 
  
0.0059 
  
0.0054 
 
1.a, b, c indicate statistical significance at less than the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively 
 
    <Table 6-5> provides the results from the above estimated equation. Parameter estimates from 
the dummy variable of firm sizeare consistent with the results from the analysis of the average 
CARs. These estimates were statistically significant at the 1% level except for CAR (0, 1) which 
appear right after the date of recommendation change. The signs of the estimates for firm size are 
all positive values for upgrade and downgrade. These results support that there is a discount for 
information about small firms in the Korean Stock Market. Moreover, the discount for small firm 
information is valid for both upgrade and downgrade recommendations. This discount effect for 
small firms becomes greater and greater as the window period is increased. Parameter estimates 
of the dummy variable of the brokerage size are not significant except for the CAR (0, 20) for 
upgrade recommendation changes. This means that the reliability of the information source is not 
an important factor to determine the size of the CARs for downgrade. However, the reliability of 
the information source might be a factor in the size of CAR for upgrade over a relatively long-
term window (21-day). These results are consistent with results which we report in the section of 
the analysis of CARs. 
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    The estimates of dummy variable for unanticipated recommendation changes are statistically 
significant at the 1% level for upgrade in all windows. These results indicate that stock prices 
respond significantly to unanticipated recommendation changes not only around the event day but 
also for the relatively long-term window (21-day). However, estimates of unanticipated 
recommendation changes for downgrade show a somewhat different feature. Unanticipated 
recommendation downgrades do not have significant effects on CARs around the event day, even 
though there are negative effects on the CARs for longer windows such as the CAR (0,5), the 
CAR (0,10), and the CAR (0,20). These results from the pooled regression analysis support the 
view that anticipations for recommendation changes might be an important factor to determine 
the magnitude of the CARs. 
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Chapter VII 
Conclusion 
 
    In this study, I examine whether recommendations from chaebol brokerages are systematically 
different from recommendations from non-chaebol brokerages. Second, I study market reactions 
to recommendations from chaebol brokerages which are faced with various incentives. This 
research also examines the anticipation of recommendations. I group recommendations into 
anticipated or unanticipated recommendations and examine price reactions to recommendations 
in both groups. 
    For the first topic, I find empirical evidence that chaebol brokerages issue less favorable 
recommendations compared to non-chaebol brokerages. Chaebol brokerages issue 45.2% of hold 
and sell rating recommendations, whereas non-chaebol brokerages issue only 33.2% of hold and 
sell rating recommendations. The price reactions to less favorable recommendations from chaebol 
brokerages is stronger than those to more favorable recommendations from non-chaebol 
brokerages. This evidence is consistent with the result from Barber et al. (2007) where investment 
banks issue more favorable recommendations and price reactions to these recommendations are 
weaker. Most previous studies also indicated that investment banks or affiliated brokerages have 
an incentive to issue upward biased recommendations for covered firms. The revenue from 
underwriting activities, such as IPOs or SEOs, is the main portion of their revenues, hence they 
try to keep good relationships with covered firms to participate in the process of IPOs or SEOs. In 
contrast, chaebol brokerages seem to be less restricted with this incentive. Investors also 
recognize that less favorable recommendations are issued from chaebol brokerages. As a 
consequence, recommendations from chaebol brokerages generate significantly stronger price 
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reactions than those from non-chaebol brokerages. Using event-time analysis, I find that 
recommendations from chaebol brokerages produce larger CARs than those from non-chaebol 
brokerages. Using buy and 1-month holding portfolios, I also find that the hedge portfolio returns 
from chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations generate significant excess returns, whereas hedge 
portfolio returns from non-chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations do not generate significant 
excess returns.  
    Over all, the distribution of recommendations from chaebol brokerages is not similar to those 
from investment banks which previous papers examined. This differences between chaebol 
brokerages and investment banks arise from the difference in incentives which they have. 
Investors in the KSE recognize that chaebol brokerages provide more conservative 
recommendations. As a result, investors react more to chaebol brokerages‟ recommendations. 
    For the second topic, I suspect that chaebol brokerages issue more favorable recommendations 
for affiliated chaebol firms than for unaffiliated firms, hence the price reactions to these 
recommendations for affiliated chaebol firms are weaker than those to recommendations for 
unaffiliated firms. I find evidence that chaebol brokerages issue different recommendations for 
affiliated chaebol firms and unaffiliated firms. Chaebol brokerages provide more favorable 
recommendations for affiliated chaebol firms. This more favorable recommendation for affiliated 
chaebol firms is consistent with results from previous papers, such as Michaely and Womack 
(1999), Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), Lin and McNichols (1998), and O‟Brien et al. 
(2005). These previous papers indicated that affiliated analysts provide more favorable 
recommendations for affiliated firms.  
    In my research, firms in the same chaebol are closely related to each other by their cross-
holding of shares, the intra-chaebol transactions, and the sharing of resources. Hence chaebol 
brokerages are not independent from other firms in the same chaebol and chaebol brokerages‟ 
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recommendations for affiliated chaebol firms act like recommendations for family members. As a 
result, these recommendations have to be more favorable. Actually, for chaebol firms, affiliated 
chaebol brokerages issue 0.2% of sell and 3.9% of strong buy rating recommendations, whereas 
unaffiliated chaebol brokerages provide 2.9% of sell and 0.7% of strong buy rating 
recommendations. The average of recommendations from affiliated chaebol brokerage is 2.31 and 
the average from unaffiliated chaebol brokerages is 2.46. The difference in average between the 
two types of analysts is 0.15 is statistically significant. I also find there are price reactions to 
recommendations for chaebol firms from affiliated chaebol brokerages and unaffiliated chaebol 
brokerages. The stock price reaction is inconsistent with results from most previous papers which 
show investors react less to recommendations from affiliated brokerages, since investors know 
affiliated brokerages‟ incentives to issue more favorable recommendations. The CARs of upgrade 
recommendations, strong buy or buy reiterations from affiliated chaebol brokerages are larger 
than those from unaffiliated chaebol brokerages.  
    This finding is consistent with the result from Clarke et al. (2004). They indicated that 
recommendations from investment banks lead to stronger price reactions, although investment 
banks seem to provide more favorable recommendations. However, the CARs of downgrade 
recommendations from affiliated chaebol brokerages are not significant for 2-day, 6-day, and 11-
day windows. This CAR is only significant for the 21-day window and it is significantly larger 
than those of downgrade recommendations from other chaebols. Using portfolio returns, I find 
similar evidence with the CAR analysis. The hedge portfolio return from affiliated chaebol 
brokerages is significant, whereas those from other chaebol brokerages or non-chaebol 
brokerages are not significant.  
    Overall, investors evaluate recommendations from affiliated chaebol brokerages as more 
informative than those from unaffiliated brokerages, while affiliated chaebol brokerages seem to 
provide more favorable recommendations for affiliated chaebol firms. This evidence from 
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affiliated chaebol brokerage is inconsistent with my two hypotheses about market reactions to 
more favorable recommendations. One of the possible explanations for this puzzling evidence is 
that investors trust the information hypothesis that recommendations from affiliated chaebol 
brokerage are more accurate, whereas chaebol brokerages provide more favorable 
recommendations for affiliated chaebol firms. Another possible explanation is that chaebol 
brokerages usually hire analysts who have superior skills to evaluate firms‟ prospects. This 
finding indicates a policy suggestion. We are not able to derive common relationships between 
the distribution of recommendations and the accuracy of recommendations, hence any policies 
which tempt brokerages to issue more hold or sell rating recommendations might not be 
appropriate for increasing accuracy of recommendations.  
    For the anticipation of recommendations, I investigate the differences between the excess 
returns from anticipated and unanticipated recommendation changes. To distinguish anticipated 
and unanticipated recommendation changes, I use two models to predict probabilities of 
recommendation changes: the ordered logit model and the ordered probit model. For upgrade 
recommendation changes, I find that the CARs from unanticipated recommendation changes are 
significant, whereas the CARs of unanticipated recommendation changes are insignificant. For 
downgrade recommendation changes, I also find that the differences between CARs from 
anticipated and unanticipated recommendation changes are statistically significant. However, 
these differences between two groups are smaller than the differences of CARs for the upgrade 
case. I suppose that these different price reactions between upgrade and downgrade might be the 
result of the limitation of short-sales in the market. The results with anticipations for future 
recommendation changes show that investors form their own anticipations for recommendations 
and compare actual recommendation changes to their own anticipations when they evaluate stock 
analysts‟ recommendations.  
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    In summary, my research finds that chaebol brokerages provide less favorable 
recommendations than non-chaebol brokerages and investors react more to recommendations 
from chaebol brokerages. Second, I also find evidence that affiliated chaebol brokerages issue 
more positive recommendations for affiliated chaebol firms than unaffiliated brokerages. In 
contrast to results from previous papers, price reactions to recommendations from affiliated 
chaebol brokerages are stronger than those from unaffiliated brokerages. I leave the answer for 
this puzzling evidence from affiliated chaebol brokerages for future studies. Third, I find 
evidence that anticipations for recommendation changes strongly influence stock price reactions. 
The price reactions to unanticipated upgrades or downgrades are much stronger than those to 
anticipated upgrades or downgrades. In particular, stock prices respond more to unanticipated 
upgrade recommendations than to unanticipated downgrade recommendations. 
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